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RECORDINGS, TRANSCRIPTS, AND TRANSLATIONS AS
EVIDENCE
By Clifford S. Fishman*
Abstract: Secretly recorded conversations often play a vital role in criminal trials.
However, circumstances such as background noise, accidents, regional or national idioms,
jargon, or code may make it difficult for a jury to hear or understand what was said--even if
all participants were speaking English. Thus, a recording's value as evidence will often
depend on whether an accurate transcript may be distributed to the jury. This Article
discusses several legal issues, including: Who should prepare a transcript? What should it
contain? How should its accuracy be determined, and by whom? Should the transcript be
considered evidence, or only an "aid to understanding" the recording? Should expert
testimony be admitted to interpret jargon and codes?
When the conversation was in another language, additional issues arise: Who should
translate the conversation into English? What methodology should the translator use? How
should a court determine the accuracy of the translation? How should the conversation be
presented to the jury? How can the adverse party challenge the accuracy of the translation
before and during the trial?
By blending existing case law, general evidentiary principles, common sense and his own
experience as a prosecutor, the author offers answers to each of these questions.
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the execution of dozens of court-authorized wiretap and eavesdrop orders; wrote search warrants
leading to the seizure of untold quantities of heroin, cocaine, and marijuana, as well as a two
hundred pound bag of peat moss; oversaw the purchase of the most expensive pound of pancake
mix in the history of American law enforcement; and became well acquainted with the agonies and
ecstasies of recordings, transcriptions and translations. Since joining the law faculty at Catholic
University, he has taken occasional court assignments to represent indigent defendants, in which
capacity he complains loud and long about prosecutorial tactics which he himself employed with
great delight against defense attorneys when the shoe was on the other foot.
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INTRODUCTION
Surreptitiously recorded conversations have long played a prominent
role in American trials.' Few, if any, forms of evidence are likely to be
as probative-or as devastating. We see this most often in criminal
cases: rather than rely on the testimony of witnesses who may be
vulnerable to various forms of impeachment, a prosecutor simply allows
a defendant's words to speak for themselves.2 It is quite difficult for a
defense attorney to "impeach" a recording of criminals planning or
reminiscing about their crimes. The impact of such evidence can be
equally dramatic in civil litigation.
3
Assuming the conversation was recorded lawfully,4 the use of the
1. The first U.S. Supreme Court decision to discuss the admissibility of a secretly recorded
conversation was Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963), but such recordings had been offered
in state and federal trials for a considerable time before that. See Thompson v. State, 298 P.2d 464,
466-67 (Okla. Crim. App. 1956) (reviewing state and federal cases in which secretly recorded
conversations were admissible at trial).
2. In the overwhelming majority of cases involving recordings, transcripts, and translations, a
prosecutor is the offering party. The issues discussed in this Article are equally applicable, however,
when such evidence is offered by a criminal defendant or civil litigant.
3. Use of recorded conversations by civil litigants arises in a variety of contexts, but the most
frequent probably occurs in child custody actions. In the typical case, the custodial parent
surreptitiously records the child's telephone conversations with the other parent, an action which
most courts consider lawful only if the custodial parent can establish that he or she did so, not to
gather dirt against the other parent, but because of a good-faith concern about the child's welfare.
See, for example, Cacciarelli v. Boniface, 737 A.2d 1170, 1174-76 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1999),
in which a father, the custodial parent, surreptitiously taped his three young children's phone
conversations with their mother because they regularly became upset and cried and misbehaved
after speaking to her. The court held that the tapes, which recorded the mother falsely telling the
children that their father would put her in jail, force her to sell her house, and give away their dog,
were admissible at a hearing on the mother's motion to alter the custody arrangements. (The opinion
does not indicate the ultimate outcome of the custody battle.) But such secret recording has its risks:
the offended parent can sue for unlawful interception of communications, and it is generally a jury
question whether the parent (lawfully) recorded the conversations because of a legitimate concern
for the child's welfare, or (unlawfully) did so merely out of spite to spy on the other parent. See
generally CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN & ANNE T. MCKENNA, WIRETAPPING AND EAVESDROPPING
§ 7:16 (2d ed. 1995 & Supp.). (And while it is somewhat off the subject of this article, as a public
service I'd like to point out, to any divorce lawyers reading this article, that most courts correctly
hold that (a) it is a crime for one spouse to secretly tap the home phone in the hopes of gathering dirt
to use against the other in a divorce action; (b) the offended spouse can sue the tapping spouse for
damages; and (c) any attorney who advises a client to do so, or uses recordings of such
conversations, can also be prosecuted or sued. See generally id. §§ 7:12-7:21.)
4. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that, so long as one participant in a conversation consents in
advance, it does not constitute a "search" or "seizure" for law enforcement officials to
surreptitiously record it. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 746-50 (1971) (plurality opinion);
United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 746-53 (1979). Federal legislation similarly permits such
Washington Law Review
recording as evidence poses no significant issues if the participants are
clearly identified and the recording is plainly audible and intelligible to
judge and jury. Often, however, these ideal conditions do not exist. As a
practical matter, therefore, the evidentiary value of a recorded
conversation will often depend on whether the offering party can give
the jury a transcript.
A variety of circumstances may render the recording difficult or
impossible to understand on an initial listening. Identity may be a
contested issue. Background noise may make it difficult to hear what
was said. Several people may be speaking simultaneously. One or more
participants in the conversation may speak with a pronounced accent.
The conversants' use of slang, jargon, or code may increase the
difficulties in making out what was said, let alone what the conversants
meant.
The challenges surrounding recorded conversations are further
compounded when some or all of the conversants speak in a language
other than English. In that case, even if the recording is free of all of the
problems just discussed, it has no evidentiary value unless an English
translation is provided to the jury. It is perhaps a common attitude that
translating a conversation from one language to another is a fairly
mechanical process: pour the foreign language into a human "machine"
called the "interpreter" or the "translator," and out comes the equivalent
in English. In reality, the process is far more subjective than objective,
and much more an art than a science, let alone a mechanical process.6
Part I of this Article examines the issues that arise when the party
interceptions without a search warrant or other judicial authorization. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2)(c); see
FISHMAN & McKENNA, supra note 3, §§ 6:4, 6:11-6:12. Most state legislatures and courts follow
the federal approach. For a state-by-state breakdown, see id. §§ 6:13-28. Other challenges to the
legality of such interceptions are discussed in id. §§ 6:3, 6:5, 6:29-6:32.
Federal law also permits private citizens to record their own conversations without the knowledge
or consent of other participants, unless the recording is made for the purpose of committing a crime
or tort. 18 U.S.C. § 251 l(2)(d). See FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 3, §§ 6:33-6:37. Most states
follow this approach, although some states require the consent of all participants. See id. at § 6:38.
Absent the consent of a participant, a private citizen acting on his own may not lawfully wiretap or
eavesdrop on a private communication, 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1). See FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra
note 3, §§ 4:1-4:12. And, with rare exceptions, law enforcement officials may do so only after
obtaining an interception order which resembles a search warrant with many additional
requirements and restrictions. See generally id., ch. 8 (spelling out the requirements of a Title III
interception order).
5. Audibility and intelligibility are defined and discussed infra at Part I.A.2.
6. Some of the problems typically faced by interpreters and translators are discussed infra at Part
II.A.
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offering a recording in evidence also seeks to have a transcript of that
recording distributed to the jury. I argue that the traditional view--that
the transcript is not evidence but merely an "aid" to the jury to help it
"understand" the recording 7
-is unrealistic and fails to recognize or
adequately address the challenges of presenting a recording as evidence.
Some courts, by contrast, categorize a transcript as opinion evidence of
the contents of the recording and direct that its admissibility should be
regulated by the rules governing opinion testimony. 8 Part I demonstrates
that the latter approach addresses these issues far more realistically and
honestly and should be followed by courts generally. Part I also
addresses a variety of other issues, such as who should prepare the
transcript and what it may and should contain, when it is offered as
evidence.
Part II examines the issues that have arisen or are likely to arise with
regard to recordings of conversations in languages other than English.
These issues include: Who should translate and transcribe the
conversation? How should the accuracy of the transcription and
translation be tested and by whom? Should the recording itself be played
for the jury? How should the translation be presented to the jury? What
should the translation contain? What should the judge tell the jury about
how they should use the translation as evidence?
I. RECORDINGS AND TRANSCRIPTS: BASIC PRINCIPLES
Before examining how courts should treat a recorded conversation in
a language other than English, it is worthwhile to briefly review how
courts do, and should, deal with recordings and transcripts of English-
language conversations. A recording is admissible only if the offering
party authenticates it and establishes its audibility and intelligibility. A
transcript may be distributed to the jury only if its accuracy has been
adequately shown.
A. Recordings
Like any physical object being offered in evidence, a recording must
be authenticated: a litigant must offer evidence establishing that the
object is what that litigant claims it is. It is also necessary to establish
that it is possible for a listener to hear and understand what the recording
7. See infra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 48-58 and accompanying text.
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contains. Courts take a variety of approaches to each of these
requirements.
1. Authentication
The first step in offering a recording (or a transcript or translation of
the recording) into evidence is to authenticate the recording. 9 Prior to the
enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975, many courts
imposed strict and elaborate authentication requirements. One frequently
cited authentication regime was first articulated by the Georgia Court of
Appeals. In Steve M. Solomon, Jr., Inc. v. Edgar,10 the court stated:
A proper foundation for [the use of a mechanical transcription
device] must be laid as follows: (1) It must be shown that the
mechanical transcription device was capable of taking
testimony. (2) It must be shown that the operator of the device
was competent to operate the device. (3) The authenticity and
correctness of the recording must be established. (4) It must be
shown that changes, additions, or deletions have not been made.
(5) The manner of preservation of the record must be shown. (6)
Speakers must be identified. (7) It must be shown that the
testimony elicited was freely and voluntarily made, without any
kind of duress."
These seven requirements were cited approvingly by a number of
state courts' 2 and by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York in United States v. McKeever,'3 which in turn has been cited
numerous times by other federal courts. 
14
9. For an extensive discussion of this topic, see FISHMAN & McKENNA, supra note 3, §§ 24:13-
20 (1995 & Supp. 2005).
10. 88 S.E.2d 167 (Ga. Ct. App. 1955).
11. Id. at 171.
12. See, e.g., Alonzo v. State, 219 So. 2d 858, 878 (Ala. 1969) (noting that the seven-factor test
appears to have been generally accepted as a correct statement of the law"); Lamar v. State, 282
N.E.2d 795, 797, 800 (Ind. 1972) (discussing and modifying the seven-factor test); Commonwealth
v. Brinkley, 362 S.W.2d 494, 497 (Ky. 1962) (certifying that a proper foundation has been
established for evidence that meets the seven-factor test); Adams v. State, 407 P.2d 169, 173 (Nev.
1965) (upholding foundation based on requirements set forth in the seven-factor test).
13. 169 F. Supp. 426, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). The last requirement, "voluntarily made," is often
included with the other requirements, but, as I argue elsewhere, this requirement does not belong in
the authentication process and merely muddies the authentication framework. See FISHMAN &
MCKENNA, supra note 3, § 24:13(e) (Supp. 2005).
14. See, e.g., United States v. Branch, 970 F.2d 1368, 1371-72 (4th Cir. 1992) (noting that the
seven McKeever factors "provide guidance to the district court when called upon to make rulings on
authentication issues"); United States v. Biggins, 551 F.2d 64, 66 (5th Cir. 1977) (noting that
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Rule 901(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, however, only requires
that tape recordings satisfy the broad requirement necessary to
authenticate any physical object. Rule 901(a) states: "The requirement of
authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility
is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in
question is what its proponent claims."' 5 Federal courts and most state
courts now apply the broad "sufficient to support a finding" standard to
recordings of conversations. 16
The broad "sufficient to support a finding" standard can be satisfied
in a variety of ways. If a participant in the conversation (for example, an
undercover agent or informant) is available to testify, it suffices for the
witness to testify that he or she recalls the conversation, has listened to
the recording, and is satisfied that the recording accurately captured
what was said. 17 If a participant is not available to testify, someone who
although they neither reject nor adopt the seven McKeever factors as a whole, some of the factors
"may justifiably be imposed on the party seeking to introduce sound recording evidence"); United
States v. Starks, 515 F.2d 112, 121 (3d Cir. 1975) (noting that the seven McKeever factors are a
"useful exposition" in determining whether there is sufficient foundation for admission of a tape
recording); United States v. Millan, 817 F. Supp. 1072, 1080 (S.D.N.Y 1993) (noting that the
Second Circuit has adopted a general standard in lieu of adopting the seven McKeever factors for all
cases).
15. FED. R. EVID. 901 (a). Uniform Rule of Evidence 901(a) is substantively identical.
16. See infra note 17 (listing cases that hold explicitly or implicitly that Federal Rule of Evidence
901(a) or equivalent state law regulates the authentication of recordings). But see United States v.
Hamilton, 334 F.3d 170, 186 (2d Cir. 2003) (stating, in the same paragraph, that "the government
[must] produce clear and convincing evidence of authenticity and accuracy as a foundation for the
admission of such recordings" and that the appropriate standard is "sufficient to support a finding"
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
17. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 136 F.3d 1176, 1181 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting that the
foundation for admitting a recording was properly laid where an informant testified that the tape
truly and accurately recorded the conversation, that his initials were on the tape, and that the tapes
were in the same condition as the last time he saw them); United States v. White, 116 F.3d 903,
920-21 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that recordings were properly authenticated where "one witness
testified at length about the process of creating the tapes and identified the originals, and where
another witness confirmed the accuracy of the portions of the tapes with which he was familiar");
United States v. Rodriguez, 63 F.3d 1159, 1167 (lst Cir. 1995) (holding that a recording was
properly authenticated where a testifying informant identified the tape, stated that the tape was
accurate, and verified his own voice on the recording, and where witnesses corroborated aspects of
the informant's testimony and testified that the recording was not tampered with before trial);
United States v. Buchanan, 70 F.3d 818, 827 (5th Cir. 1995), amended by 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS
40280 (5th Cir. Feb. 22, 1996) (holding that a recording was properly authenticated where
government agents testified to being present at the recorded conversation, the making of the
recording, and the accuracy of the reproduction of the conversation); United States v. Clark, 986
F.2d 65, 68-69 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that the foundation of a recording was properly laid where
an undercover agent testified to recording the conversation, taking the tape to be duplicated,
listening to the copy, and confirming that it accurately reflected the conversation); United States v.
479
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monitored the conversation as it occurred may authenticate it in the same
fashion. 18 In the absence of such a witness, the recording can be
authenticated circumstantially. 19
Under the more liberal approach, it is generally no longer necessary
Jones, 730 F.2d 593, 597 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding that the foundation for a recording was properly
laid where an informant testified that he agreed to tape a conversation with defendant, personally
recorded the conversation, identified the tape played in court as the tape he recorded, and testified
that the voices on the tape were his and defendant's, and that this sufficed even where there was no
testimony regarding the control of the tape before trial); Johnson v. State, 823 So. 2d 1, 23-25 (Ala.
Crim. App. 2001) (holding that recordings of9l1 calls were properly authenticated where a witness
testified that the recordings were an accurate representation of what occurred during the calls,
despite defendant's objection that the witness could not identify all background voices on the
recording); Smithey v. State, 602 S.W.2d 676, 679-80 (Ark. 1980) (finding "that the testimony of
participants to the conversation as to the accuracy of the tapes and the transcript, the testimony of a
police officer who actually heard the conversations occur transmitted to him electronically, who had
reviewed the written transcript as compared to the tape recording, and the review of the video tape
recording of the conversation satisfies the requirements of Rule 901 and the testimony was
admissible"); McCoy v. State, 853 So. 2d 396, 404 (Fla. 2003) (stating that "[n]othing more than
this confirmation, by a participant in the conversation, that the tape fairly and accurately
memorialized the discussion at issue is required to properly authenticate the recording"). Accord
People v. Aliwoli, 606 N.E.2d 347, 361-62 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992); McCollum v. State, 582 N.E.2d
804, 811-12 (Ind. 1991); State v. Klindt, 389 N.W.2d 670, 674-75 (Iowa 1986); State v. Treadwell,
575 P.2d 550, 553 (Kan. 1978); State v. Vaughn, 431 So. 2d 763, 767-68 (La. 1983); State v.
Cyran, 586 A.2d 1238, 1240-41 (Me. 1991); Berry v. State, 823 So. 2d 574, 576-77 (Miss. Ct. App.
2002); In re L- , 499 S.W.2d 490, 494 (Mo. 1973); People v. McGee, 399 N.E.2d 1177, 1182-
83 (N.Y. 1979); State v. Jeffries, 303 S.E.2d 618, 620 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983); Commonwealth v.
Starks, 450 A.2d 1363, 1364-65 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982); Hasley v. State, 786 S.W.2d 733, 734-35
(Tex. App. 1989); Hensley v. State, 48 P.3d 1099, 1105-06 (Wyo. 2002).
18. See United States v. Hamilton, 334 F.3d 170, 186-87 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that a recording
was properly authenticated where a government witness testified to hearing and recording the
conversation); United States v. Rodriguez-Garcia, 983 F.2d 1563, 1569 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding
that testimony of a federal agent who listened in on recorded phone conversations between
defendant and an undercover agent, and later participated in their transcription and translation, was
sufficient to establish the authenticity of the recordings).
19. See, e.g., United States v. Fuentes, 563 F.2d 527, 532 (2d Cir. 1977). The informer who
recorded his conversation with the defendant vanished before trial. Id. at 529. The Second Circuit
held that the authentication requirement was satisfied by testimony of Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) agents who had kept close surveillance on the informer during his meetings
with the suspects and recovered the tapes after each of the meetings, although they could not hear
the conversations as they occurred. Id. at 531-32. The court rejected defense speculation that the
informer might have tampered with the tapes by manipulating the on/off switch during his
conversations with the defendant, reasoning that attempting to do so might have gotten the informer
killed. Id. at 532. See also State v. Klindt, 389 N.W.2d 670, 674 (Iowa 1986), overruled on other
grounds by State v. Reeves, 636 N.W.2d 22, 25 (Iowa 2001) (holding that circumstantial evidence
was sufficient to authenticate a tape that the informant gave to a friend for safekeeping before the
informant disappeared); State v. Jones, 595 S.E.2d 124, 132-34 (N.C. 2004) (holding that a tape
recording was sufficiently authenticated where it had been found ten months after the crime was
committed but where persons who came in contact with the tape insisted that they did not tamper
with it).
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for the offering party to demonstrate the chain of custody for the tape
from the time the conversation was first recorded on it to the date it is
offered in evidence. 20 Even where courts do require such evidence, it is
not necessary to account for the location and custody of the tape for
"each minute" between those dates; 21 it is sufficient to show a chain of
custody which establishes the "reasonable probability that no tampering
occurred., 22 Minor infirmities in the chain of custody are insufficient to
bar admissibility of a recording, but are relevant as to the weight the jury
chooses to give to it.23 Nevertheless, even if chain of custody evidence is
not legally required, such evidence is useful to help the offering party
assure the jury that the tape has not been tampered with.
In a criminal case where the conversations were recorded pursuant to
an interception order under federal or state statutes, 24 it suffices that a
witness with knowledge testify generally about how the interception
equipment was set up and tested, the procedures employed, and the
20. Alonzi v. People, 597 P.2d 560, 562 (Colo. 1979) (noting that "[a] chain of custody is
necessitated only where it is not possible to establish the identification of the evidence by the
testimony of a single witness"). Contrast Alonzi with United States v. Starks, 515 F.2d 112, 121-22
(3d Cir. 1975), decided prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which held that
chain of custody evidence is generally required unless chain of custody is unchallenged.
21. Brooks v. State, 234 S.E.2d 541, 550 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977) (quoting Davis v. State, 217 S.E.2d
343, 345 (Ga. Ct. App. 1975)).
22. Wilson v. State, 343 A.2d 613, 617 (Del. 1975). Similarly, see United States v. Fuller, 441
F.2d 755, 762 (4th Cir. 1971). See also United States v. Brown, 136 F.3d at 1182 (finding that
where defendants did not suggest a break in the chain of custody, nor allege tampering or altering,
"there is a presumption that a system of regularity accompanied the handling of the evidence if the
exhibits are at all times within official custody"); Summerall v. State, 734 So. 2d 242, 245 (Miss.
Ct. App. 1999); People v. Portanova, 392 N.Y.S.2d 123, 128 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977).
23. See, e.g., People v. McGee, 399 N.E.2d 1177, 1183 (N.Y. 1979).
24. In 1968, Congress enacted Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act,
which authorized federal prosecutors to apply for, and federal judges to issue, court orders
authorizing the surreptitious interception of wire and oral communications. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82
Stat. 212 (1968) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (2000)). An interception order is
in essence a search warrant, which must be based on probable cause and contain a particular
description of the type of communications sought (i.e., the type of crime being investigated), but the
statute imposes several additional requirements. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520. For example, before
an application is submitted to a federal judge, it must be approved by a high official in the U.S.
Department of Justice, 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1), and the application must establish that investigators
unsuccessfully tried to obtain comparable evidence by using ordinary investigative procedures, or
that use of such procedures would be too dangerous or would have little chance of success. See 18
U.S.C. §§ 2518(l)(c), (3)(c). Title III authorized state legislatures to enact similar legislation, so
long as state law protects communicational privacy at least as fully. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(2).
(Electronic communications were added in the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986,
Pub. L, 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848.) For an exhaustive analysis of federal and state law, see FiSHMAN &
MCKENNA, supra note 3.
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records that were kept documenting the interceptions. It is not
necessary to authenticate each individual conversation.26 Recordings
made pursuant to specific statutes often must comply with additional
statutory requirements.27
2. Audibility and Intelligibility
The evidentiary value of a recorded conversation depends in large
measure on who said what, but a jury's ability to use that information
depends upon two qualities of the recording: 28  audibility and
intelligibility. Audibility relates to whether the listener is able to hear
what is on the recording. Intelligibility relates to whether the listener is
able to understand what the conversants said. The issue courts most
often focus on is intelligibility.29
Issues relating to the audibility and intelligibility of a recording
should be litigated prior to trial. The offering party has the initial burden
of establishing a recording's audibility and intelligibility.30 Some
recordings are plainly audible and intelligible; as to them no problem
arises. Many recordings, however, are only marginally audible or
intelligible. 31 The ultimate test of audibility and intelligibility is whether
25. See United States v. Cortellesso, 663 F.2d 361, 364 (1st Cir. 1981); United States v. Cuesta,
597 F.2d 903, 914-15 (5th Cir. 1979).
26. Cortellesso, 663 F.2d at 664; Cuesta, 597 F.2d at 914-15.
27. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(a) imposes requirements on conversations intercepted
without the consent of a participant, but pursuant to an interception order:
Immediately upon the expiration of the period of the order, or extensions thereof, such
recordings shall be made available to the judge issuing such order and sealed under his
directions. Custody of the recordings shall be wherever the judge orders.... The presence of
the seal provided for by this subsection, or a satisfactory explanation for the absence thereof,
shall be a prerequisite for the use or disclosure of the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic
communication or evidence derived therefrom [at any court proceeding].
State statutes contain corresponding provisions. For a detailed discussion of the sealing requirement,
see FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 3, ch. 16.
28. Most of the issues discussed in this Article arise whether the case is being tried to a judge or
to a jury. However, when a jury is hearing the case, these issues pose much more challenging
questions. Accordingly, this Article addresses these issues in the jury trial context.
29. An inaudible recording is by definition unintelligible: if it is impossible to hear what is on the
tape, it is also impossible to understand what is said on it. On the other hand, a recording may be
perfectly audible without being intelligible; the listener may have no difficulty hearing background
noise and multiple voices but be unable to discern what specific people are saying.
30. See 23 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D Foundation for Audio Recordings as Evidence 315
(2005) (noting that the offering party has the burden of production, which is satisfied by adequate
foundation evidence).
31. See, e.g., United States v. Moncivais, 401 F.3d 751,756 (6th Cir. 2005).
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the offering party has been able to produce a transcript of the recording
which accurately reflects the recording's contents.32
Frequently, recordings contain inaudible or unintelligible passages
because of background noise, mechanical difficulties, or other problems.
As a rule, partial inaudibility or unintelligibility is not a bar to
admissibility if the court is satisfied that the jury would not be forced to
speculate about the contents of the inaudible or unintelligible portions.33
Where, however, the prosecution produces a transcript of a recording
which, to everyone but the transcriber, is unintelligible, the only
appropriate response is to exclude both the tape and the transcript.
34
32. Id. (rejecting defendant's motion to exclude a consensual recording of marginal sound quality
on the grounds that an expert translator, hired by the defendant, testified that he was able to
transcribe most of the tape, albeit with difficulties). Issues relating to transcript accuracy are
discussed infra at Part I.B.5.
33. Moncivais, 401 F.3d at 756; United States v. Font-Ramirez, 944 F.2d 42, 46-47 (1st Cir.
1991); United States v. Mittleider, 835 F.2d 769, 773 (10th Cir. 1987) (other aspects abrogated by
Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994)); United States v. Sims, 719 F.2d 375, 379 (1lth Cir.
1983); United States v. Jones, 693 F.2d 343, 346-47 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Slade, 627
F.2d 293, 301-02 (D.C. Cir. 1980); United States v. Frazier, 479 F.2d 983, 985 (2d Cir. 1973);
Avery v. State, 589 So. 2d 1313, 1315 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991); Bell v. State, 668 P.2d 829, 835-36
(Alaska Ct. App. 1983); State v. Kennedy, 592 P.2d 1288, 1293 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979); Loy v. State,
832 S.W.2d 499, 500-01 (Ark. 1992); People v. Siripongs, 754 P.2d 1306, 1320-21 (Cal. 1988);
People v. Jeffers, 690 P.2d 194, 198-99 (Colo. 1984); People v. Haider, 829 P.2d 455, 456-57
(Colo. Ct. App. 1991); McCoy v. State, 853 So. 2d 396, 402-04 (Fla. 2003); Guess v. State, 443
S.E.2d 477, 479 (Ga. 1994); Coleman v. State, 750 N.E.2d 370, 372-73 (Ind. 2001); Johnson v.
Commonwealth, 90 S.W.3d 39, 45-46 (Ky. 2002), as modified, (Jan. 13, 2003); Commonwealth v.
Silva, 516 N.E.2d 161, 166-67 (Mass. 1987); Easter v. State, 878 So. 2d 10, 19 (Miss. 2004); In re
L- , 499 S.W.2d 490, 494 (Mo. 1973); State v. Loveless, 308 N.W.2d 842, 846-47 (Neb. 1981);
People v. Lubow, 272 N.E.2d 331, 336 (N.Y. 1971); State v. Coleman, 707 N.E.2d 476, 488 (Ohio
1999); Cooper v. State, 671 P.2d 1168, 1172 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983); State v. Donato, 414 A.2d
797, 805 (R.I. 1980); State v. Harris, 286 S.E.2d 251, 255 (W. Va. 1982). Where a malfunction
results in recording only the informant's half of a conversation, not the defendant's, the recording,
and the informant's testimony about the conversation are admissible, despite defendant's claim that
his statements (which were unrecorded) were all exculpatory, so long as the defendant had the
opportunity to cross-examine the informant and to testify about the conversation. United States v.
Apperson, 441 F.3d 1162, 1198 (10th Cir. 2006) (inferentially holding that what the defendant did
or did not say was simply a factual issue for the jury to resolve).
34. One such case involved the lamentable disappearance of a five-month old girl from her
parents' home. See United States v. Aisenberg, 358 F.3d 1327, 1333-34 (1 1th Cir. 2004). Local
police quickly came to suspect the parents, and obtained court orders authorizing the wiretapping
and bugging of the couple's home; based on the tapes, the parents were indicted by the federal
government for obstructing the investigation into the disappearance. See id. at 1331-32. Ultimately
the government dismissed the indictment, implicitly acknowledging, among other things, that the
local police had lied in their application for the original interception orders and on the applications
for extensions, and that the tapes were so unintelligible that the purported transcripts were
essentially fictitious. See id. at 1333-34. The parents sued for attorneys' fees and expenses under
the Hyde Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (2000), which requires plaintiffs to establish that "the position of
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B. Transcripts
The use of a transcript of a recorded conversation at trial raises issues
of authentication, admissibility, and presentation. These issues include:
Who should be permitted to prepare such a transcript? What should it
contain? How should it be authenticated? How should its accuracy be
tested, and who (judge or jury) has the ultimate say in its accuracy?
What use may the jury make of a transcript, and how should the judge
instruct the jury on the matter? Should a jury be permitted to receive the
transcript in the jury room during deliberations?
1. Transcribing and Authenticating the Transcript
It is axiomatic that if a litigant wants the jury to consider any exhibit
or item of evidence, it is up to that litigant to produce it; the same is true
with regard to the transcript of a recorded conversation. If a conversation
was recorded with the consent of a participant, such as an undercover
officer, the question arises: should the consenting participant prepare the
transcript? On first impression, the answer might seem obvious: of
course. After all, she was there; she participated; she knows what was
said; and she is the witness who can most readily testify about the
conversation, authenticate the tape, and attest to the transcript's
accuracy. Having the undercover participant prepare the transcript also
saves time and resources, because there is no need to assign the task to
someone else. Accordingly, courts generally permit the offering party to
distribute a transcript prepared in whole or in part by a participant in the
conversation,35 assuming the transcript's accuracy has been adequately
the United States was vexatious, frivolous, or in bad faith." See Aisenberg, 358 F.3d at 1335. The
government conceded that the parents were entitled to recover fees and expenses, but contested the
amount the trial judge awarded. See id. at 1335-36. The child's fate is still a mystery. See CBS
NEWS, Where's Baby Sabrina?, Jan. 13, 2005, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/01/13/
48hours/main666740.shtml?CMP=ILC-SearchStories.
35. When affirming the admissibility of an informant's transcription of a recording in which he
was a conversant, a First Circuit panel explained:
The objectivity of the transcriber of a tape obviously bears on the decision whether or not to
admit a transcript into evidence. The tape recording and not the transcript is evidence in the
case. The transcript should, therefore, mirror the tape and should not be an amalgam of the
recording and the hearsay testimony of persons present at the conversation. Where inaccuracies
in the transcript combine with possible bias in the transcription process, a transcript may be
excluded from evidence. The touchstone, however, is the accuracy of the transcript.
United States v. Font-Ramirez, 944 F.2d 42, 48 (1st Cir. 1991) (internal citation omitted). See also
Slade, 627 F.2d at 303 (participant in conversation can help identify the voices during transcript
preparation); Henry v. State, 629 So. 2d 1058, 1059 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (allowing for the
authentication of a transcript by having "the person who prepared the transcript... testify that he
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established.36
Some courts, however, have held that a transcript prepared by a
participant should not be distributed to the jury.37 This assures that, with
regard to portions of the recording that are difficult to make out, the
transcriber has not filled in those passages with what she remembers
from the conversation, rather than what the recording actually contains,
and prevents the participant from, in essence, corroborating her own
testimony as to what was said.38 And even if participant transcription is
allowed, where a recording is difficult to make out, the party offering the
transcript may gain a subtle tactical advantage if a non-participant in the
investigation prepares the transcript because the jury is more likely to
witnessed the events recited in the transcript and thus had personal knowledge that the transcript
was an accurate rendition of the tape-recording"); State v. Smith, 656 S.W.2d 882, 888 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1983) (holding that it is permissible for a consenting participant to make clarifications and
additions to the transcript).
New York's intermediate appellate courts are divided on the subject. Compare the decision by the
First Department of the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division in People v. Reynolds, 595
N.Y.S.2d 451, 452 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993), explicitly authorizing admission of a transcript prepared
by the undercover officer who participated in the conversation, with the Second Department's
approach, enunciated in People v. Mincey, 406 N.Y.S.2d 526, 527 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978)
(disapproving of this procedure). See also People v. Batista, 703 N.Y.S.2d 885, 887 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2000) (noting the different approaches to the question taken by the Second Department and the
First, in which New York County is located).
36. See infra Part I.B.5.
37. A New York appellate court has expressed concern about the possibility of distributing a
participant's transcript to the jury, holding that where a tape is "inaudible," the fact that a participant
can transcribe it "will not render the tape admissible since that individual is relying on his memory,
not the actual sounds on tape.. " People v. Warner, 510 N.Y.S.2d 292, 293 (N.Y. App. Div.
1987) (citing Mincey, 406 N.Y.S.2d 526). That court therefore frowns on permitting a participant in
the conversation to prepare the transcript. See also People v. Colon, 449 N.Y.S.2d 11, 11 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1982). Instead, the transcript must be prepared by an independent third party. See Mincey,
406 N.Y.S.2d at 527. But where the recordings are clear enough so that "independent third parties
can listen to [them] and produce a reasonable transcript," it is permissible that the transcripts be
prepared by police officers who heard the conversation as it took place. Warner, 510 N.Y.S.2d at
292 (quoting Mincey, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 527).
On the other hand, Ohio appellate courts are divided as to the propriety of allowing a participant
to prepare the transcript. Compare Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co. v. Santora, 444 N.E.2d 1076, 1081
(Ohio Ct. App. 1982) (holding that admission of a transcript was reversible error where the
transcript was prepared by a participant of the conversation and the recording of the conversation
was both available and audible) with State v. Holmes, 521 N.E.2d 479, 485-86 (Ohio Ct. App.
1987) (finding no prejudicial error despite preparation of the transcript by a nonobjective party and
availability of the original recordings, because "appellant [wa]s unable to point out any material
differences between the tapes and the transcript supplied to the jury as listening aids"). Courts have
addressed similar issues with regard to who should translate a non-English conversation. See infra
notes 123-127 and accompanying text.
38. See supra note 37.
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accept the word of someone who has no direct stake in the case.
The question also arises: may the transcribing of a recorded
conversation be a group project? Anyone who has attempted to
transcribe a recorded conversation knows from experience that, just as in
general "two heads are better than one," when transcribing difficult
passages of a recording, four ears (or six, or eight... ) are often better
than two. It is entirely appropriate for the person transcribing a recording
to ask other people to give a listen, to see if someone else can make out a
passage that has stumped the transcriber.3 9 Quite often the new listener is
able to do so. Most of us have experienced something very much like
this: You hear a song on the radio, and you like it, but there is a lyric or
two that you just can't "get," even after hearing it several times ("The
girl with colitis goes by"?). Then you happen to be in your car with a
friend when the song comes on, and you ask your friend, "What was that
last bit that they sang?" As soon as your friend says "'The girl with
kaleidoscope eyes,"' you immediately know that your friend is right.
The next time the song plays, you can hear those words quite plainly.40
So, too, with transcripts: If person "X"' is unable to "solve" a particular
passage but, once person "Y"' has done so, X is able to hear for himself
that Y is correct, then X can honestly testify that in his opinion the
transcript-including the portion first solved, deciphered, or pieced
together by Y-is accurate.4'
While it can be helpful or necessary to have more than one person
transcribe difficult passages, it is improper for the offering party to
decide the recording's, and therefore the transcript's, contents by
"consensus." 42 Thus, the witness who will testify to the accuracy of the
transcript must be the final arbiter of what the offering party's transcript
39. Such was my experience as a prosecutor, and this procedure was highly recommended by the
translators and transcribers with whom I have spoken in researching this Article.
40. See Pamela LiCalzi O'Connell, Sweet Slips of the Ear: Mondegreens, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9,
1998, at G4 (citing examples of famous song lines that listeners may hear incorrectly, such as "Hold
me closer, Tony Danza" for Elton John's "Hold me closer, tiny dancer"; in the Beatles' song, Lucy
in the Sky With Diamonds, "The girl with colitis goes by" for "The girl with kaleidoscope eyes";
and "'scuse me while I kiss this guy" for Jimi Hendrix's "'scuse me while I kiss the sky"); see also
THE ARCHIVE OF MISHEARD LYRICS, http://www.kissthisguy.com.
41. See, e.g., People v. Batista, 703 N.Y.S.2d 885, 886-88 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002).
42. See United States v. Robinson, 707 F.2d 872, 876-79 (6th Cir. 1983). Several transcript drafts
were compared and discussed; the final product was a consensus as to what the tapes did, and the
transcripts should, contain. Id. at 877. Thus, no one person was able to testify that in his or her
opinion, the transcript was accurate. Id. at 879. In light of the questionable audibility and
intelligibility of the tapes themselves, the court held that distribution of the "consensus transcripts"
was reversible error. Id.
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will contain. If other investigators claim to be able to discern what is
said in a passage but that passage on the recording is inaudible or
unintelligible to the person who is to testify, that portion of the tape must
be transcribed as "inaudible" or "unintelligible."
2. The Transcript's Role
There is perhaps little need to provide a jury with a transcript of an
English language conversation which is recorded with sound-studio
quality and in which the participants speak slowly and clearly with
accents that are readily understandable to all listeners. Such recordings
may be available with some frequency on television cop shows. In the
real world, however, they are somewhat less frequent. Accordingly, the
evidentiary value of a recorded conversation will often depend to a
significant extent on whether the offering party is allowed to provide a
transcript of the recording to the jury. This, in turn, may depend on how
the court categorizes the transcript. Some courts regard a transcript as
merely an aid to assist the jury in understanding what is on the
recording.4 a Others consider the transcript as opinion evidence which
should be tested under the standards that apply generally to opinion
evidence. 4
A number of courts insist that only the recording itself is actual
evidence, and that the transcript is merely an aid to assist the jury in
following what is on the recording. This rationale was enunciated in
People v. Feld,45 a widely cited 1953 decision of New York's highest
court:
To allow the court and jurors to hold in their hands a transcript
as they listened to the playback of the records was no different
than allowing them to have, in an appropriate case, a
photograph, a drawing, a map or a mechanical model, any of
which have long been recognized as an assistance to
understanding. a6
Endorsements of this approach may still be found in the case law.
43. See infra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
44. See infra notes 48-58 and accompanying text.
45. 113 N.E.2d 440 (N.Y. 1953).
46. Id. at 444.
47. See, e.g., United States v. Brandon, 363 F.3d 341, 343 (4th Cir. 2004); McCoy v. State, 853
So. 2d 396, 402-03 (Fla. 2003); Guess v. State, 443 S.E.2d 477, 479-80 (Ga. 1994); State v.
Owens, 643 N.W.2d 735, 754-55 (S.D. 2002); Mayhue v. State, 969 S.W.2d 503, 506-07 (Tex.
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A more realistic view, articulated by the Fifth Circuit in United States
v. Onori,48 is that once a transcript has been authenticated and evidence
has been introduced as to its accuracy, the transcript is admissible
opinion evidence as to what is said on the recording.49 In Onori, the
government had recorded conversations with the consent of a
participant.50 At trial, a government agent testified as to how she had
prepared a transcript of the conversations. 51 At a hearing held in the
jury's absence, a defense expert testified "that there were more than fifty
errors in the government's transcript," particularly with regard to voice
identifications of the declarants.52 The trial judge offered to allow the
defense witness to testify before the jury and to allow the jury to see and
compare the government's transcript with the defense's transcript "to
help it decide the question of which portions of each transcript were
correct., 53 However, "[t]he defense, contending that the government's
version of the conversation was highly prejudicial, rejected this offer,"
and only the government's transcript was made available to the jury.54
When the judge made the government's transcript available, he
instructed the jury that the transcript was not itself evidence, but was
being provided only for the jury's "convenience," and to assist jurors in
identifying the voices.55 The Fifth Circuit upheld the trial judge's
distribution of the government's transcript, but concluded that "the best
Crim. App. 1998); Jackson v. Commonwealth, 590 S.E.2d 520, 532-33 (Va. 2004); Burns v.
Commonwealth, 541 S.E.2d 872, 888 (Va. 2001); State v. Hardesty, 461 S.E.2d 478, 483-84 (W.
Va. 1995). Each of these courts therefore holds that the judge must instruct the jury that the
transcript is not evidence and must not be considered as such.
48. 535 F.2d 938 (5th Cir. 1976).
49. Id. at 947-48. Although the court did not explicitly use the term "opinion evidence," it
compared conflicting testimony about the contents of a recording to conflicting testimony from
handwriting experts as to whether a signature on a document is genuine. See infra note 58 and
accompanying text. Signature authenticity is a well-established subject of expert opinion testimony.
See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(3) (permitting authentication of contested handwriting by an expert
who has compared the contested document to an authenticated exemplar).
50. Onori, 535 F.2d at 941.
51. Id. at 946.
52. Id. at 947, 949 n.7.
53. Id. at 947.
54. Id. at 947, 949. The opinion does not explain why the defense did not take the judge up on
this offer, but it appears that the defense goal was not so much to assure that the jury received an
accurate transcript, but to prevent the jury from seeing any transcript. This would be a plausible
strategy if, for example, the defense expert's testimony about supposed voice misidentifications on
the transcript would simply have reattributed incriminating statements from one defendant to
another without ultimately weakening the government's case.
55. Id. at 946.
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procedure for the use of transcripts was not followed in this case," and
proceeded to "review this problem area in some depth and to suggest
more appropriate means of dealing with contested transcripts. 56 The
"vagueness" of the "assist the jury concept," the court commented,
produced "confusion" as to the transcripts' role and the procedures to be
followed,57 and suggested the following in its stead:
We believe that the use of a transcript as a guide is analogous to
the use of expert testimony as a device aiding a jury in
understanding other types of real evidence. For example, an
issue in a case may be whether John Doe's purported signature
on a document is actually John Doe's signature. Two
handwriting experts may disagree, and if they are asked to
testify on each side of the dispute, their divergent testimony
creates a jury issue .... Here two "experts" [and their respective
transcripts] were available to aid the jury in determining the real
issue presented, the content and meaning of the tape recordings.
It is therefore incorrect to think of the transcripts as simply an
"aid"-as better lighting fixtures in the courtroom would be an
"aid" to the jury's vision of witnesses-and not as evidence of
any kind. They are evidence and, like other evidence, may be
admitted for a limited purpose only. That purpose here, as the
court outlined in its special instruction, was primarily to
establish the identity of the speakers at any particular time.58
As a practical matter, the approach a court takes is often unimportant,
either because the adverse party does not challenge the accuracy of the
transcript, or because the transcript's accuracy is so readily apparent that
a judge would make it available to the jury regardless of whether the
transcript is categorized as evidence of the contents of the recording, or
only as an aid to understanding the recording. Sometimes, however, how
the transcript is categorized may determine how several of the other
issues are resolved, including whether the tape and transcript may be
presented to the jury at all. The Onori approach, that a transcript of a
marginally intelligible recording constitutes opinion evidence of its
contents, more realistically reflects the actual role that the transcript of
such recording plays when the recording and transcript are offered to a
jury than does the "aid to understanding" concept. Not surprisingly, a
56. Id. at 947.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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substantial number of courts have confirmed the value of the Onori
approach by adopting it.5 9
If the transcript is regarded as opinion evidence, the question arises:
should it be considered expert opinion or lay opinion evidence? Federal
Rule of Evidence 702 defines expert testimony as that based on
"scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge., 60 The translation
of a foreign language conversation into English obviously does require
"specialized knowledge" and therefore is regulated by Rule 702.61
Whether transcribing an English language conversation falls within this
definition is unclear; arguably, the process generally requires only a
62good ear and a great deal of patience. If so, the transcript constitutes
lay witness opinion evidence, which is governed by Federal Rule of
Evidence 701:
Rule 701. Opinion Testimony by Lay Witnesses
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness'
testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to
those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on
the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear
understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination of
a fact in issue, and (c) not based on scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.63
A litigant should have no difficulty establishing that the transcript of a
marginally intelligible recording falls within this definition. If a
recording is plagued by background noise and other characteristics that
make it difficult to discern what was said, a witness who has listened to
a recording numerous times has "perceived" the contents of the
recording in a way which a juror in a courtroom cannot. Moreover, the
more difficult the recording is to understand on an initial listening, the
more the witness' transcript of the conversation is "helpful ... to ... the
determination of a fact in issue," i.e., to a determination of who said
59. See, e.g., United States v. Collazo, 732 F.2d 1200, 1203 (4th Cir. 1984). But see United States
v. Brandon, 363 F.3d 341, 343, (4th Cir. 2004) (observing approvingly that a district judge gave an
"aid in listening" instruction); United States v. Rrapi, 175 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 1999); United
States v. Hogan, 986 F.2d 1364, 1376 (11th Cir. 1993); People v. Polk, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 921, 926-
27 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996); State v. Loveless, 308 N.W.2d 842, 846-47 (Neb. 1981).
60. FED. R. EVID. 702.
61. See infra at Part II.B.1.
62. In Onori, the Fifth Circuit referred to the witnesses who prepared the transcript as "experts"
in quotation marks. See supra text accompanying note 58.
63. FED. R. EVID. 701. (Rule 701 of the Uniform Rules of Evidence is substantively identical.)
Vol. 81:473, 2006
Recordings, Transcripts, Translations
what.
Thus, the admissibility of the transcript of an English language
conversation will not depend upon whether it is categorized as lay or
expert opinion testimony. The only real difference between the two is
that, assuming an appropriate discovery request is made, the prosecutor
is required to disclose prior to trial its expert witness's
"opinions, the bases and reasons for those opinions, and the witness's
qualifications. 64 But since issues relating to the transcript are generally
litigated prior to trial, the adverse side will receive notice and disclosure
in any event.
3. "Best Evidence Rule"
Occasionally a party against whom a transcript is offered will object
that the use of a transcript of a recording as evidence violates the "best
evidence rule." It does not.65 The so-called "best evidence rule," more
properly called the "original writing" rule, does not require a party to
offer the "best" evidence to prove a fact. Its purpose is to safeguard
against inaccuracies or fraud66 and to assure that, when the content of a
particular writing is of central importance to a lawsuit, a litigant should
be required to present the writing itself whenever possible.67 The rule
merely directs that to prove the contents of a writing (or in this case, a
recording), a party must either introduce the original68 or a duplicate,69
64. See FED. R. CRiM. P. 16(a)(1)(G). (Defense counsel has a similar obligation. See id. at
16(b)(I)(B)-(C).). The same, of course, is true of both parties in civil litigation. See FED. R. Civ. P.
26(a)(2)(A). If the transcript is considered lay witness evidence, it would appear to be discoverable
under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which, upon defense request, require disclosure of
"documents,... tangible objects," etc. which are material to the defense or which the government
intends to introduce during its case-in-chief. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(E).
65. United States v. Holton, 116 F.3d 1536, 1545 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Jackson v. State, 594 So.2d
1289, 1297 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991). For a detailed discussion of the application of the "best
evidence rule" to transcripts of recordings, see FISHMAN & McKENNA, supra note 3, at §§ 25:26-
25:32.
66. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 1001 advisory committee's note, 56 F.R.D. 183, 341.
67. See, e.g., 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 231 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999).
68. See FED. R. EvID. 1002: "To prove the content of a writing, recording, or photograph, the
original writing, recording, or photograph is required, except as otherwise provided in these rules or
by Act of Congress." Uniform Rule of Evidence 1002 is substantively identical.
69. Federal Rule of Evidence, Rule 1003 directs that a duplicate "is admissible to the same extent
as an original unless (1) a genuine question is raised as to the authenticity of the original or (2) in
the circumstances it would be unfair to admit the duplicate in lieu of the original." Similarly, see
UNIF. R. EVID. 1003. "Duplicate" is defined as "a counterpart produced by the same impression as
the original, or from the same matrix, or by means of photography, including enlargements and
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or must offer an adequate explanation why she is unable to do so;
thereafter, secondary evidence is admissible.7 ° Most often, the offering
party will in fact introduce the original recording into evidence, then
offer the transcript as opinion evidence of its contents, much as a litigant
might offer a photograph into evidence and then call a witness to explain
to the jury what the photograph portrays. 71  Neither the witness's
testimony about the photograph nor the transcriber's testimony and
transcript violate the "original writing (recording) rule"; each is intended
to make the "original" evidence understandable to the jury.72
4. Transcript Contents
Courts permit a party to distribute a transcript of a recording to the
jury for two purposes: to help the jury ascertain who is speaking and
what was said. This raises two questions. First, should the transcript
identify the speakers? If so, under what circumstances? Second, what (if
anything) besides the words spoken during the conversation should
appear in the transcript?
miniatures, or by mechanical or electronic re-recording, or by chemical reproduction, or by other
equivalent techniques which accurately reproduces the original." FED. R. EVID. 1001(4). Similarly,
see UNIF. R. EVID. 1001(1).
70. Federal Rule of Evidence, Rule 1004 provides:
Rule 1004. Admissibility of Other Evidence of Contents
The original is not required, and other evidence of the contents of a writing, recording, or
photograph is admissible if-
(1) Originals lost or destroyed. All originals are lost or have been destroyed, unless the
proponent lost or destroyed them in bad faith; or
(2) Original not obtainable. No original can be obtained by any available judicial process or
procedure; or
(3) Original in possession of opponent. At a time when an original was under the control of the
party against whom offered, that party was put on notice, by the pleadings or otherwise, that
the contents would be a subject of proof at the hearing, and that party does not produce the
original at the hearing; or
(4) Collateral matters. The writing, recording, or photograph is not closely related to a
controlling issue.
Similarly, see UNIF. R. EVID. 1004.
71. The analogy to a witness explaining what is shown in a photograph-the vantage point from
which it is taken, the focal length of the lens, the significance of what is shown in the photograph-
presupposes that the transcript is lay witness opinion evidence. Alternatively, if the transcript is
viewed as expert opinion evidence, the analogy might be to an X-ray, which is the "original"
evidence, and a doctor's testimony explaining its significance to the jury. Regarding whether the
transcript of an English language conversation should be considered lay or expert opinion
testimony, see supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
72. For a more detailed discussion, see FiSHMAN & McKENNA, supra note 3, §§ 25:26-32.
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a. Identifying the Speakers
A recorded conversation that is offered to prove what X and Y said to
each other is not admissible as such unless the offering party introduces
sufficient evidence identifying the conversants as X and Y. The issue is
in essence one of conditional relevancy: the conversation is relevant
against a participant only if the condition of identification has been
satisfied.3 In federal proceedings the issue is governed by Federal Rule
of Evidence 901(a), which requires only that the offering party set forth
"evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is
what its proponent claims. 74
The U.S. Supreme Court has defined "evidence sufficient to support a
finding" as enough evidence to permit a rational jury to find a fact by a
preponderance of the evidence.75 This requirement may be satisfied with
regard to voice identification in a variety of ways.76 A participant in the
recorded conversation can satisfy the requirement simply by testifying
that he has listened to the tape and read the transcript and is satisfied that
the voices are correctly identified.77 Someone who has spoken to X
either before or after a particular conversation was recorded may listen
to the recording and testify that he recognizes Xs voice on the
recording.78 X could be compelled to produce a voice exemplar.7 9 Or a
73. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 104(b):
Relevancy conditioned on fact. When the relevancy of evidence depends upon the fulfillment
of a condition of fact, the court shall admit it upon, or subject to, the introduction of evidence
sufficient to support a finding of the fulfillment of the condition.
74. The text of Federal Rule of Evidence 90 1(a) is set out supra in the text accompanying note
15.
75. Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 690 (1988) (applying the "sufficient to support a
finding" standard to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), governing the admissibility of extrinsic acts).
76. For a detailed discussion of voice identification, see FISHMAN & McKENNA, supra note 3,
§§ 24:19-25.
77. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(1) (the requirement of authentication or identification may be
satisfied by the testimony of a person with knowledge); United States v. Scott, 243 F.3d 1103, 1107
(8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Carrasco, 887 F.2d 794, 803 (7th Cir. 1989); People v. Griffin, 592
N.E.2d 930, 933-34 (Ill. 1992).
78. See FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(5) ("Identification of a voice, whether heard firsthand or through
mechanical or electronic transmission or recording, by opinion based upon hearing the voice at any
time under circumstances connecting it with the alleged speaker," suffices to satisfy the
identification requirement); United States v. White, 116 F.3d 903, 920-21 (D.C. Cir. 1997); United
States v. DiMuro, 540 F.2d 503, 513 (lst Cir. 1976); Rushing v. Rushing, 724 So.2d 911, 915
(Miss. 1998); Wilburn v. State, 856 So.2d 686, 688-89 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003). One common
technique is to have investigators speak during the booking process to various suspects who have
been arrested at the end of an investigation involving wiretapping or oral intercepts, and, based on
that familiarity with their voices, provide voice identification testimony at trial. This technique does
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voice can be identified by circumstantial evidence.80
Courts generally agree that, so long as the offering party has elicited
sufficient evidence to satisfy this standard and the jury is told that the
attribution of names to speakers on the transcript is something the
offering party has to prove,81 the transcript may identify the speakers.
8 2
b. Prohibition Against Aural Editorializing
If the transcript is received as evidence of what the recording
contains, the transcript is governed by the "mirror the tape" rule.
Common sense dictates that, other than the identity of the conversants,
the transcript should contain only what can actually be heard on the
recording. Although a witness may "narrate" the recording while
testifying, explaining what physical actions accompanied each passage
or sound on the tape, the transcript that is distributed to the jury
"should... mirror the tape and should not be an amalgam of the
recording and the hearsay testimony of persons present at the
conversation. "83
not violate the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Ceballos, 385 F.3d 1120, 1123-24 (7th Cir.
2004). Concerning the Fifth Amendment, see infra note 79.
79. In United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973), the Supreme Court held that a person has no
Fourth or Fifth Amendment right against the use of his physical characteristics, such as the sound of
his voice, and that therefore requiring a grand jury witness to produce voice exemplars did not
violate the witness's Fourth or Fifth Amendment rights. Id. at 12, 14-15. The exemplar could be
played for the jury, which could make its own comparison and assessment. See FED. R. EVID.
901(b)(3) ("[c]omparison by the trier of fact or by expert witnesses with specimens which have been
authenticated" suffices to satisfy the identification requirement).
80. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 901(b)(4) ("contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive
characteristics, taken in conjunction with circumstances").
81. See, e.g., United States v. Rochan, 563 F.2d 1246, 1251 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v.
DiMuro, 540 F.2d 503, 511 (1st Cir. 1976).
82. See United States v. Gonzalez-Balderas, 11 F.3d 1218, 1224 (5th Cir. 1994) (noting that
"[a]fter the government authenticated the transcripts as accurate renditions of [the tapes], it was
incumbent on [defendant] to raise any specific objections that he may have had to the identification
of a particular speaker"). See also United States v. Frazier, 274 F.3d 1185, 1198-2000 (8th Cir.
2001); United States v. Henneberry, 719 F.2d 941, 948-49 (8th Cir. 1983); United States v. Slade,
627 F.2d 293, 299-300, 302-03 (D.C. Cit. 1980); United States v. Hall, 342 F.2d 849, 853 (4th Cir.
1965); People v. Gable, 647 P.2d 246, 256 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982); State v. Hennigan, 404 So. 2d
222, 237 (La. 1981); State v. Olkon, 299 N.W.2d 89, 103 (Minn. 1980); State v. Plummer, 860
S.W.2d 340, 345 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).
83. United States v. Font-Ramirez, 944 F.2d 42, 48 (1st Cir. 1991). See also People v. Rao, 386
N.Y.S.2d 441, 451 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976) (Titone, J., dissenting) (arguing that it was improper to
include in the transcript a description of a declarant's physical action, even if a consenting
participant is available to describe those actions).
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The rule that the transcript "should ... mirror the tape" is a useful,
albeit limited, guideline as to what a transcript may contain with regard
to the sounds and noises captured in the recording. If sounds are audible
in the background, it would be entirely appropriate for the transcript to
include them (e.g. "Car horn honking in background"), to help the jury
follow where they are in the transcript. But such passages should be
restricted to sounds whose natures are readily apparent. It would be
particularly improper for a transcript to "explain" sounds if the
explanation suggests wrongdoing. Suppose clicking sounds can be heard
on the recording of a meeting between an informant and several
suspects. If the informant testifies, it is perfectly permissible to ask him,
"What was that clicking sound?" and have him answer, "That was
defendant Jones loading a clip into his automatic pistol." But the
transcript should read: "clicking sounds," not "sound of automatic pistol
being loaded."
Likewise, the transcript of the conversation should be limited to what
was said, without additional explanation. Assume a defendant is accused
of selling drugs to an undercover officer. On the tape of a conversation
between them, the defendant is heard counting: "twenty, forty,
sixty.... ." When the undercover officer testifies, it is entirely proper to
ask her, "What was the defendant counting?" and to have her answer,
"He was counting the money I had just handed him." The transcript,
however, should read only, "X: Twenty, forty, sixty" and not "X.
Twenty, forty, sixty [counting money]."
Nor should a transcript include creative use of punctuation as a visual
hint to the jury that the words spoken have a hidden meaning. Thus, it is
improper for a transcript to put quotation marks around certain words
that the government claimed were code words used to conceal the illegal
nature of the conversation.t 4 It would be equally improper to denote such
84. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez-Maldonado, 115 F.3d 9, 17 (1st Cir. 1997). In Gonzalez-
Maldonado, the government's transcripts had quotation marks around the word "ticket," which the
government claimed referred to money, and "accident," which allegedly referred to arrest. Id. The
First Circuit correctly held that this was error:
The quotation marks used in the transcripts submitted to the jury in this case reflect the
government's theory of the case. The government does not claim that there is any audible
emphasis or other vocal inflection placed on the marked words that is discernible when
listening to the tape and failed, both at trial and on appeal, to offer any legitimate explanation
for the quotation marks. We hold that the trial court committed error when it allowed the use of
transcripts that contained quotation marks around certain words. It is not enough that the court
instructed the jury that only the tapes, and not the transcripts, were evidence. Nor is it enough
for the government to subsequently present evidence that the words were code words. The
government should not be allowed to bolster its argument by customizing the transcript to
reflect its own theory of the case.
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words by the use of italics or capital letters. 85
5. Testing Transcript Accuracy
The less audible and intelligible a recording is, the more important it
is for the jury to have access to a transcript of the recording. As the
importance of jury access to the transcript increases, so does the question
of whether the transcript accurately reflects what the conversants said.
Regardless of whether the transcript is regarded only as an "aid to
understanding," or as opinion evidence of the contents of the tape, 86 it is
likely to have a significant impact on the jury.
At some point before or during a trial, a determination should be
made as to whether the transcripts to be shown to the jury are accurate.
In a criminal case, the initial burden should be on the defense to seek
discovery of all recordings and transcripts the prosecutor plans to offer
in evidence,87 and then to bring a pretrial challenge to those portions of
the transcript he or she claims are inaccurate.88 Failure to make a timely
objection waives the issue.89 If objections are raised to the accuracy of
particular portions, the judge should attempt to resolve such objections
Id.
85. Some punctuation is of course necessary to communicate the meaning of what was recorded.
This inevitably will involve some degree of interpretation by the transcriber. Where the defendant
claims that the punctuation included in a transcript unfairly shades its meaning, such issues can be
addressed to the court or, under the Onori approach, explored on cross-examination of the person
who prepared the transcript. When the conversation is in English, the problem of interpretive
punctuation is generally a minor one, because when jurors hear the conversation they can interpret
for themselves such characteristics as pauses, apparent indecision, inflection, and emphasis.
86. See supra Part I.B.2.
87. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(E) ("[u]pon a defendant's request, the government must
permit the defendant to inspect and to copy.. , papers, documents, data.., within the government's
possession, custody, or control," if "the item is material to preparing the defense," if the government
expects to offer it in evidence, or if it was taken from or belongs to the defendant) (emphasis
added). Unless the defense requests such material, the prosecution is under no obligation to provide
it except for the constitutional obligation to provide defense counsel with exculpatory evidence or
information even without a defense request. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86-87 (1963).
88. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(3)(E) (mandating that motions for discovery must be made
prior to trial); FED. R. CRiM. P. 12(b)(3)(C) (imposing the same requirements on a motion to
suppress); FED. R. CRiM. P. 12(c) (authorizing the judge to set deadlines for pretrial motions).
89. See, e.g., United States v. Brandon, 363 F.3d 341, 343 (4th Cir. 2004); United States v.
DeLeon, 187 F.3d 60, 65 (1st Cir. 1999); United States v. Chiarizio, 525 F.2d 289, 293 (2d Cir.
1975). Each of these cases holds that it is the defendant's obligation to challenge the accuracy of the
transcripts, and that in the absence of such a challenge, the trial court has no obligation sua sponte to
review them.
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and arrive at a transcript which all parties will stipulate to be accurate. 90
Although there is little civil case law on the subject, in civil litigation the
preliminary steps should follow the same basic pattern. 91
When the parties are unable to resolve objections to the transcript by
stipulation, courts are divided on whether the judge or jury should be the
final arbiter on what the transcript should contain. Some, following the
approach approved by the Fifth Circuit in Onori,92 hold that each party
should present its evidence about the transcript to the jurors, who then
decide which version (if either) it will rely on.93 Others give the judge
discretion to either decide what the transcript should contain, or to
follow the Onori approach.94 Still others require the judge to determine
the contents of the transcript if the parties cannot agree. 95 Barring the
90. United States v. Holton, 116 F.3d 1536, 1540-41 (D.C. Cir. 1997); United States v. Onori,
535 F.2d 938, 948 (5th Cir. 1976); Chiarizio, 525 F.2d at 293; United States v. Turner, 528 F.2d
143, 167 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. McMillan, 508 F.2d 101, 105-06, (8th Cir. 1974); People
v. Polk, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 921, 926-27 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996); State v. Dominguez-Ramirez, 563
N.W.2d 245, 250 n.2 (Minn. 1997).
91. In civil litigation, the offering party is obliged to disclose such evidence. See, e.g., FED. R.
Civ. P. 26(a)(3)(C) (requiring pretrial disclosure from each party at least 30 days before trial, unless
otherwise directed by the court, of "an appropriate identification of each document, or other exhibit,
including summaries of other evidence,.. . which the party expects to offer .... ). Thereafter, the
adverse party may bring a motion in limine, per FED. R. EVID. 103(a)(2), seeking to exclude the
recording, the transcript, or both, on whatever grounds might apply: that the conversation was
recorded unlawfully, or that the recording is inaudible or unintelligible, or that the transcript is
inaccurate, etc.
92. 535 F.2d 938, 948 (5th Cir. 1976).
93. See, e.g., United States v. Hogan, 986 F.2d 1364, 1376 (11 th Cir. 1993). But see United States
v. Aisenberg, 120 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1347 (M.D. Fla. 2000) (holding that the accuracy of transcripts
is "never" for the jury to decide); Polk, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 926-27; State v. Loveless, 308 N.W.2d
842, 846-47 (Neb. 1981) (plurality opinion). And courts generally acknowledge that the "transcript
as aid to listening" rationale simply cannot apply to the translation of a conversation in a foreign
language. See infra Part II.G.
94. See, e.g., United States v. Delgado, 357 F.3d 1061, 1070-71 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v.
Jacob, 377 F.3d 573, 581 (6th Cir. 2004) (expressing a strong preference that the trial judge
determine the contents of the transcript, as first enunciated in Robinson, but upholding variations so
long as the goal, which "is to provide the jury with transcripts which bear a 'semblance of
reliability,"' is met (quoting United States v. Robinson, 707 F.2d 872, 879 (6th Cir. 1983))); Holton,
116 F.3d at 1542-43; United States v. Booker, 952 F.2d 247, 249-50 (9th Cir. 1991); United States
v. Devous, 764 F.2d 1349, 1353-55 (10th Cir. 1985) (citing approvingly to United States v. Slade,
627 F.2d 293, 302 (D.C. Cir. 1980)); Robinson, 707 F.2d at 876-79; United States v. Bell, 651 F.2d
1255, 1259 (8th Cir. 1981); Slade, 627 F.2d at 302; People v. Haider, 829 P.2d 455, 456-57 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1991) (citing approvingly to both Slade and Onori); State v. Ahmadjian, 438 A.2d 1070,
1082-83 (R.I. 1981).
95. McCoy v. State, 853 So. 2d 396, 402-05 (Fla. 2003). See also People v. Garcia, 811 N.Y.S.2d
402, 404 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (where portions of a defendant's videotaped statement were
difficult to understand because of his speech impediment, and each side produced materially
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rare case where the judge is convinced the prosecutor's transcript is
essentially bogus,9 6 the Onori approach best reflects the appropriate
roles of judge and jury.
An additional point on "accuracy" merits mention. Judicial discussion
of a transcript's "accuracy," as the preceding text explains, focuses on
whether the transcript correctly reflects what the conversants said-e.g.,
whether X said "I'm gonna" or "Ain' gonna." Ideally, however, the
offering party should strive for more, and should take every reasonable
measure to assure the transcript is as accurate as possible. A transcript
made during a criminal investigation, for example, which was quite
sufficient for investigative purposes, is not necessarily a good transcript
to offer at trial. Investigative transcripts are generally made by police
officers, who are primarily interested in getting the gist of the
conversation, rather than accurately reflecting every syllable that is said.
Moreover, police officers are likely to be less concerned about and less
skilled at the nuances of grammar, spelling, homonyms and punctuation
than they are at conducting surveillance and anticipating what the targets
of the investigation are likely to do next. Before submitting a transcript
for distribution to a jury, a prosecutor should review it to assure proper
spelling and punctuation. Equally important, the transcript should, to the
extent possible, reflect every verbal utterance and stutter that can be
heard on the recording-even those which are relatively insignificant.
The more accurate the transcript is with regard to portions the jury can
hear plainly, the more credibility the jury is likely to give to those
portions of the transcript where the recording is difficult to make out97 -
e.g., because of background noise-which is likely to be a matter of
some importance where, as is often the case, the subjects of the
investigation chose just such circumstances to have their most important
conversations.
6. Expert Testimony Interpreting Conversations
People who engage in specialized fields tend to develop "terms of art"
and informal jargon with meanings that are a mystery to the
differing transcripts of the statement, "the court properly exercised its discretion in excluding both
transcripts," because it would be unfair to introduce only one side's version, while submitting
competing versions "would have been confusing for the jury").
96. See, e.g., supra note 34.
97. Some jurors may be oblivious to or unimpressed by this attention to detail, but if it has a
favorable effect on even one or two jurors, the effort will have been worth it.
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uninitiated.98 Criminals are no exception.99 As the Eighth Circuit has
observed, "There is no more reason to expect unassisted jurors to
understand drug dealers' cryptic slang than antitrust theory or
asbestosis."' 00 The problem is compounded by the fact that criminals
often go out of their way to make it difficult for the uninitiated or
uninvited listener to understand what they say. 10' To complicate matters
further, particular groups of criminals who regularly do business
together often develop an internal code of their very own.
Thus, to help the jury understand a recorded conversation, it is often
necessary to call a witness to explain the terms of art, translate the
jargon, and crack the code. A witness who participated in the
conversation may give such testimony without qualifying as an expert,
because his or her opinion is based on what the witness has personally
98. To non-attorneys, for example, "Establishment Clause" might be taken to refer to Santa's
stodgy older brother, and "free exercise," a membership promotion at the nearby health club.
Consider, for example, what a lay person might make of the terms "in camera," "under color of
law," and "privy," For a collection of legal terms of art whose "legal" definitions differ somewhat
from how ordinary people understand them, see BRYAN A. GARNER, THE REDBOOK: A MANUAL ON
LEGAL STYLE § 11.3 (2002).
99. Examples:
"H" is slang for heroin (1930s to the present). JONATHAN GREEN, THE CASSELL DICTIONARY
OF SLANG 550 (1998).
"Hooker" is slang for prostitute (mid-eighteenth century to the present). Id. at 609.
"Ice" as a noun, is slang forjewelry, particularly diamonds. Id. at 629.
"Ice" as a verb is slang for "kill" (1940s to the present). Id.
"Iceman" was slang for "diamond thief' (1920s-1950s) and is now slang for a paid killer
(1970s to the present). Id. at 630.
"Maryjane" is slang for marijuana (1920s to the present). Id. at 773. (The Oxford English
Dictionary also lists "Mary Jane" as a term for marijuana, with the following corroborative
entry: "1928 Daily Express II Oct. 3 What is Marijuana? A deadly Mexican drug, more
familiarly known as 'Mary Jane,' which produces wild hilarity when either smoked or eaten."
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 371 (2nd ed. 1991).)
"Snow" is slang for cocaine, although it is also sometimes used for heroin, morphine and
amphetamine (1910s to the present). GREEN, supra at 1106. (In New York City, at least in the
1970s while I was a narcotics prosecutor, "soda" was also a fairly common term for cocaine.-
CSF)
The following White House report has a particularly useful and extensive description of street
names for drugs, providing local variances (e.g., west coast v. east coast): OFFICE OF NAT'L DRUG
CONTROL POLICY, PULSE CHECK: TRENDS tN DRUG ABUSE (2002), http://
www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/drugfact/pulsechk/nov02/pulse-_novO2.pdf.
100. United States v. Delpit, 94 F.3d 1134, 1145 (8th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). The Fifth
Circuit quoted this passage approvingly after noting that, according to Lewin & Lewin, The
Thesaurus of Slang (1994), there are 223 terms for marijuana. See United States v. Griffith, 118
F.3d 318, 321 & n.3 (5th Cir. 1997).
101. As to accusations that attorneys sometimes do likewise (see supra note 98), I can only reply,
"Res ipsa loquitur."
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perceived. 10 2 A nonparticipant, by contrast, must qualify to give expert
opinion testimony as to the meaning of a conversation by showing that
he or she has specialized knowledge based on training, experience, or
both, in the type of crime at issue and in the manner in which such
criminals talk to one another.
10 3
C. Jury Access to Tapes and Transcripts During Deliberations
Just as recorded conversations often play a dominant role during a
trial, so too are they likely to be the focus of jury attention during
deliberations, and it is within the trial court's discretion to permit the
jury to re-hear recordings if they request it during deliberations.10 4
102. See FED. R. EVID. 701; United States v. De Peri, 778 F.2d 963, 977 (3d Cir. 1985) (citing
FED. R. EVID. 701); United States v. Russell, 703 F.2d 1243, 1246, 1248 (11 th Cir. 1983) (affirming
a trial court's decision to allow an undercover participant to testify as to his understanding that those
present during taped discussions intended there to be one scheme, not several, and that each
defendant agreed to perform specific tasks); United States v. Martino, 664 F.2d 860, 864-65 & n.3
(2d Cir. 1981) (testimony of informant who infiltrated a drug network). See also United States v.
Lizardo, 445 F.3d 73, 83-84 (1st Cir. 2006) (holding that a member of a conspiracy who is now
testifying for the government may explain the meaning, not only of the conversations in which he
himself participated, but also conversations among other members of the conspiracy to which he
was not a party). Although Martino and Lizardo do not explicitly refer to Rule 701 or categorize the
testimony as "lay witness testimony," it is clear that in each case the court is relying on the
witness's first-hand knowledge of the conversations in which she participated, and her knowledge
of the verbal patterns and common understandings among members of the conspiracy.
103. See generally FED. R. EVID. 702, which permits a witness to testify as an expert based on
"specialized knowledge." A substantial body of case law has developed governing expert testimony
interpreting criminal jargon, particularly in drug cases. For a detailed discussion, see FISHMAN &
MCKENNA, supra note 3, § 25:14; 5 CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN & ANNE T. MCKENNA, JONES ON
EVIDENCE §§ 41:53-59 (7th ed. Supp. 2006).
104. United States v. Holton, 116 F.3d 1536, 1542-43 (D.C. Cir. 1997); United States v. Hofer,
995 F.2d 746, 748-49 (7th Cir. 1993); United States v. Bizanowicz, 745 F.2d 120, 123 (1st Cir.
1984); United States v. Scaife, 749 F.2d 338, 347 (6th Cir. 1984); United States v. Koessel, 706
F.2d 271, 275 (8th Cir. 1983); United States v. Vadino, 680 F.2d 1329, 1338 (11th Cir. 1982);
United States v. Angelilli, 660 F.2d 23, 30 n.6 (2d Cir. 1981); United States v. Zepeda-Santana, 569
F.2d 1386, 1391 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Alfonso, 552 F.2d 605, 618 (5th Cir. 1977);
United States v. Turner, 528 F.2d 143, 167-68 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Cioffi, 493 F.2d
1111, 1116 (2d Cir. 1974); Humphrey v. State, 591 So. 2d 583, 585 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991); State v.
Snowden, 675 P.2d 289, 291 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983); Allen v. State, 247 S.E.2d 540, 542 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1978) (video and audio tapes); People v. Hunley, 728 N.E.2d 1183 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000); Linger
v. State, 508 N.E.2d 56, 60-61 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987); State v. Triplett, 79 N.W.2d 391, 397 (Iowa
1956) (tape of defendant's confession); State v. Poulos, 639 P.2d 477, 479 (Kan. 1982); State v.
Brooks, 838 So.2d 725, 728 (La. 2003) (videotapes, including audio portion); State v. Barbo, 339
N.W.2d 905, 906 (Minn. 1983); State v. Williams, 643 S.W.2d 3, 4 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); State v.
Monroe, 766 A.2d 734, 736 (N.H. 2001); State v. Halvorson, 346 N.W.2d 704, 712 (N.D. 1984);
Pfaff v. State, 830 P.2d 193, 194-95 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992); State v. Ahmadjian, 438 A.2d 1070,
1082-83 (R.I. 1981); State v. Smith, 573 N.W.2d 515, 520-21 (S.D. 1998); Chennault v. State, 667
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Common sense dictates that if a transcript was distributed to the jury
during the evidence phase of the trial, it may again be made available
when the conversation is replayed during deliberations, and courts have
so held. 10 5 Courts are divided, however, as to whether juror access to
recordings and transcripts during deliberations must be in open court in
the presence of all parties, or whether jurors may have these items in the
jury room. 106
II. FOREIGN LANGUAGE CONVERSATIONS
Each of the issues discussed in Part I as to English language
recordings-the audibility and intelligibility of the recordings, and the
accuracy and contents of the transcripts-arise as well when the
conversation is in a foreign language. Part II first provides an overview
of the complications unique to foreign language conversations. It then
reviews how courts have, and should, deal with these complications.
A. Complications Unique to Foreign Language Conversations
Because translating from one language to another is far from an exact
science, disputes as to the accuracy of the transcription and translation
are to be expected. The challenge is particularly acute if participants in
the conversation speak the same language but come from different
countries. As Winston Churchill supposedly said with regard to English,
"Great Britain and America are two countries separated by a common
language."'1 7 Illustrations of this principle are numerous. 10 8 The same is
S.W.2d 299, 302 (Tex. App. 1984); State v. Frazier, 99 Wash. 2d 180, 187-91, 661 P.2d 126, 130-
32 (1983); State v. Dietz, 390 S.E.2d 15, 28-29 (W. Va. 1990).
105. United States v. Jordan, 223 F.3d 676, 688-89 (7th Cir. 2000); Holton, 116 F.3d at 1542-43;
United States v. Rengifo, 789 F.2d 975, 982 (1st Cir. 1986); United States v. Williford, 764 F.2d
1493, 1503 (11th Cir. 1985); United States v. Robinson, 707 F.2d 872, 876-78 (6th Cir. 1983);
United States v. Turner, 528 F.2d 143, 168 (9th Cir. 1975); Cioffi, 493 F.2d at 1116; State v. Mason,
694 N.E.2d 932, 950 (Ohio 1998); Commonwealth v. Bango, 685 A.2d 564, 566 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1996); Burns v. Commonwealth, 541 S.E.2d 872, 888 (Va. 2001).
106. See FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 3, § 25:38.
107. In an attempt to confirm that Churchill actually said this, I Googled "'Two countries [etc.]'
& Churchill" and came up with 275 "hits." The first ten consist of news stories or advertisements
which say things like "As Churchill said,..." without providing any source. I would have dutifully
waded through the next 265 "hits" in the hopes that one of them would authenticate the attribution,
but my wife insisted that I help her straighten up the guest room instead.-CSF.
108. If someone from the "across the pond" says, "Bring the grips down on the lift and put them
in the boot; don't forget the pram; check under the bonnet; and take your brolly," how many people
in America would understand that a British family with a small child, who live in an apartment
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no doubt true with regard to every multi-national language. 0 9
Translating a foreign language into English is further complicated by the
fact that local and regional variations abound within each country,'1 0 as
do dialects, accents, and pronunciations."' Finally, as discussed
previously,' 12 the use of jargon, terms of art, and codes will often
complicate matters even further.
Even assuming that both sides' translators agree as to the words that
were spoken in the other language, they still might quite reasonably
disagree as to how to translate those words into English. A literal
translation of such a conversation might be almost meaningless. A
translation which does not merely translate but also "interprets" jargon,
on the other hand, would be impermissibly suggestive.
1 13
Where the parties cannot agree on what the translation should contain,
the best solution is to leave the matter to the adversary system. Each side
should submit its translation to the jury, and it should be left to the jury
building, is planning a trip by car on a rainy day? (In American English, that sentence would read:
"Bring the suitcases down on the elevator and put them in the trunk. Don't forget the baby carriage;
check under the hood; and take your umbrella."). See 12 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 91 (2d
ed. 1989) ("across the pond" for "the other side of the Atlantic Ocean"); 6 THE OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY 850 (2d ed. 1989) (defining "grip" as meaning what Americans call a suitcase); 8 THE
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 918 (2d ed. 1989) (defining "lift" as meaning what Americans call
an elevator); 2 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 404 (2d ed. 1989) (defining "boot" as meaning
what Americans call the trunk of a car); 12 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 285 (2d ed. 1989)
(defining "pram" ("perambulator") as meaning what Americans call a baby carriage); 2 THE
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 389 (2d ed. 1989) (defining "bonnet" as meaning what Americans
call the hood of a car); 2 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 578 (2d ed. 1989) (defining "brolly"
as what Americans call an "umbrella").
109. For example, in most of the Arabic-speaking world, a particular word simply means, "to
look." In Lebanon, however, the word means, "to look through the peephole"; and in Tunisia, the
same word means "to fart." Nabil M. Abdel-A1, Cultural Variations in Arabic, PROTEUS (Nat'l
Ass'n of Judiciary Interpreters and Translators, Seattle, WA), Winter 2005, Volume XIII, No. 4 at
1,4.
110. For example, if I walk into a store and buy a phosphate and a grinder, what will I do with
them-and by the way, where am I? I'll drink the phosphate (a localism for "soda" in southern New
Hampshire, eastern New England, and parts of Connecticut and Rhode Island) and eat the grinder (a
localism for "hero sandwich" throughout New England except Maine). See Steven Baumholtz,
Letter, Soda by Any Other Name, N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1989, at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/
fillpage.html?res=950DE4D7103AF93BA25753C1A96F948260 (last accessed June 21, 2006);
Bert Vaux & Scott A. Golder, Dialect Survey, http://cfprod0l.imt.uwm.edu/Dept/FLL/linguistics/
dialect/staticmaps/q_64.html (last accessed June 21, 2006).
111. To appreciate the problem, picture the difficulties a litigant would encounter in, say, France,
or Japan, or Egypt, in which adversaries are contesting the transcription and translation of a
conversation between life-long residents of the Bronx, rural Mississippi, and New Hampshire.
112. See supra Part I.B.6.
113. See infra notes 165-169 and accompanying text.
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to decide which (if either) translation it finds persuasive. 14 A judge
should intervene and impose her view on the matter only if she is
convinced that the prosecutor's original language transcript or
translation has no defensible basis." 1
5
B. Translation of Foreign Language Conversation as Expert Opinion
Evidence
Translating a conversation from another language into English
requires "specialized knowledge [that] will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence."' 16 Thus, it is governed by the rules regulating
expert opinion testimony. American jurisdictions differ somewhat as to
the standards governing the admissibility of expert testimony,' 17 but with
regard to the admissibility of a translation of a foreign language
conversation, common sense dictates the basic ground rules. First, the
offering party must elicit testimony from the witness who translated the
conversation that he or she has sufficient proficiency in English and the
other language-i.e., that he or she qualifies as an "expert" in both
languages-to produce a reliable translation. Second, the translator must
testify that he or she used reliable methods and procedures in translating
the conversation. If the offering party satisfies these two requirements,
the transcript is admissible, unless the adverse party persuades the judge
that the translation is nevertheless untrustworthy." 18
1. The Translator
The offering party must establish its translation witness's expertise in
114. See infra Parts II.B and II.C.
115. See infra note 118 and accompanying text.
116. FED. R. EVID. 702.
117. The general subject of how to assess admissibility of expert opinion testimony has, since
1993, been the subject of three U.S. Supreme Court decisions, dozens of state supreme court
opinions adopting, adapting, or rejecting the U.S. Supreme Court's lead, an amendment to Federal
Rule of Evidence 702, and a radically different amendment to Uniform Rule of Evidence 702, and
has generated enough scholarly literature to deforest a large continent. For an overview, see 5
CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN & ANNE T. McKENNA, JONES ON EVIDENCE, ch. 40 (7th ed. Supp. 2006).
Fortunately, none of this controversy is particularly relevant to the subject of this article.
118. Applying the principles the U.S. Supreme Court has enunciated regarding expert testimony
generally, the trial court's initial focus should be on the translator's credentials, and the principles
and methodology he or she employed. Cf Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595
(1993). But the court may nevertheless exclude his or her translation if its only connection to the
underlying data is the witness's "ipse dixit." Cf Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997).
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both the foreign language and English and the ability to translate from
one to the other.1 19 If the party fails to provide testimony attesting to the
accuracy of the translation, the translation ought not be admitted.
120
There is little case law discussing precisely what the offering party must
show in order to establish that the person who prepared the translation
was qualified to do so, but common sense suggests the following. At a
bare minimum, the witness must establish that he or she has sufficient
proficiency in each language to be able to understand, and be understood
by, others who speak or write in each.' 21 Evidence of formal education
in each language enhances the showing; likewise, evidence that the
witness has lived in locations in which each is spoken regularly will
strengthen the witness's qualifications. Familiarity with the particular
dialect or localisms with which the conversants spoke is of course also
useful. Formal training or prior experience in the art of transcribing and
translating is another useful credential.
After testifying to his qualifications, the witness explains how he or
she transcribed and then translated the conversation. The witness then
authenticates both the transcription and the translation, and testifies to
their accuracy. 22 This procedure suffices to secure admissibility of the
119. The Federal Rules of Evidence explicitly recognize this with regard to courtroom
interpreters. Federal Rule of Evidence 604 provides: "An interpreter is subject to the provisions of
these rules relating to qualification as an expert and the administration of an oath or affirmation to
make a true translation." Uniform Rule of Evidence Rule 604 is substantially similar. Florida courts
apparently require a translator to certify under oath that he or she will give a truthful and accurate
translation of a recorded conversation. See, e.g., Almodovar v. State, 925 So.2d 425, 426 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2006) (holding that the absence of such a certification was harmless error where defendant
did not challenge the accuracy of the translation).
120. See, e.g., United States v. Sutherland, 656 F.2d 1181, 1200-01 (5th Cir. 1981) (observing
that "when the transcript contains a translation into English of conversations spoken in a foreign
language, the proponent must introduce the testimony of a qualified witness to authenticate and
verify the translation," but holding that where two of the three participants to a recorded
conversation, although not explicitly testifying to the accuracy of the translation, described the
conversation in sufficient detail, the error in admitting the unattested translations was harmless
error).
121. See, e.g., United States v. Gutierrez, 367 F.3d 733, 735 (8th Cir. 2004) (finding that
testimony of a police officer who attested that he was fluent in written and spoken Spanish, that he
had worked as an undercover officer on more than a hundred occasions, almost always with
Spanish-speaking individuals, that he had communicated regularly with the defendant's
coconspirator, always in Spanish, and that they had no trouble understanding each other, "provided
a sufficient foundation for the introduction of the transcripts").
122. See United States v. Rengifo, 789 F.2d 975, 982-83 (1st Cir. 1986) (observing that the two
translators testified that they first transcribed the conversations in Spanish, then translated them into
English, and were cross-examined about their knowledge of Spanish, familiarity with different
dialects, etc.); United States v. Chalarca, 95 F.3d 239, 246 (2d Cir. 1996) (observing that after the
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translation, except in the rare case where the trial judge has grave doubts
as to the witness's expertise or credibility.
Courts are divided as to whether someone who was a participant in a
recorded conversation may later transcribe or translate the conversation.
Given that a translation is opinion evidence of the transcriber/translator,
there is no inherent reason to reject a translation prepared by a
participant in the conversation (e.g., an undercover officer). 123 Some
courts, however, reject the propriety of permitting a participant in the
conversation to prepare the translation. New York's intermediate
appellate courts, for example, are sharply divided on this issue. Two
such courts permit the practice. 124 A third, by contrast, has held that it is
reversible error to allow an undercover officer's transcribed translation
of his own consensually recorded conversations to go to the jury; 125 that
court insists that a recording must be translated by an independent
interpreter, who would not be permitted to utilize the officer's
translation "while evaluating ... the audibility of the tape." 126 Some
recording's clarity was enhanced by filtering out background noise, a court-certified translator
transcribed the tape and testified to its contents). See also FiSHMAN & McKENNA, supra note 3,
§ 24:11 n.58.
123. United States v. Font-Ramirez, 944 F.2d 42, 47-49 (1st Cir. 1991) (observing that although
"[t]he objectivity of the transcriber of a tape obviously bears on the decision whether or not to admit
a transcript into evidence," the "touchstone" issue "is the accuracy of the transcript," and holding
that, given defendant's failure to offer an alternate transcript or identify specific inaccuracies, it was
not abuse of discretion to admit the informant's transcript of his conversation with the defendant, on
which an interpreter relied in translating the conversation to English); Pena v. State, 432 So. 2d 715,
717 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (holding it was not error to distribute to the jury a translation of a
Spanish language conversation prepared by the detective who "made" the recording; it is unclear
whether the detective was a participant in the conversation, or merely supervised the recording
equipment).
124. People v. Reynolds, 595 N.Y.S.2d 451, 452 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (holding that preparation
of the transcripts of a conversation in Rastafarian Jamaican dialect, unintelligible even to other
Jamaicans and therefore equivalent to a foreign language, by an undercover participant rather than
by an independent third party, "does not affect the admissibility of either the tapes or the
transcripts" (citation omitted)); People v. Valdez-Rodrigues, 652 N.Y.S.2d 797, 799-800 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1997) (upholding use of a translated transcript prepared by the defendant's erstwhile ac-
complice, at least where no objection was raised at trial to its use).
125. See People v. Pagan, 437 N.Y.S.2d 384, 385 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981) (reasoning that there
was too great a risk that the translation might reflect the undercover officer's memory of the
conversation, rather than what was recorded on the tapes).
126. Id. It appears not to have occurred to the court that the accuracy of the translation of a tape is
a factual issue for the jury to decide, and that if the defense sought to challenge the officer's
translation, it could have done so by offering an expert witness of its own. Id. Moreover, the same
court "disapproved" of allowing an official court translator to listen to a tape privately to prepare a
translation, apparently insisting upon an in-court translation as the tape is played in court. People v.
Carrasco, 509 N.Y.S.2d 879, 880-81 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986). To insist that a court interpreter
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courts in other states will allow participants to transcribe or translate
conversations, but with certain limitations.1
27
Often, a case will involve numerous conversations-a typical wiretap
or oral intercept investigation may involve hundreds, even
thousands' 28-which were transcribed and translated by several different
people over the course of a lengthy investigation. It would be
cumbersome, time-consuming, and expensive to insist that the
prosecutor call the individual who prepared a particular transcript and
translation before the prosecutor is allowed to introduce any given
conversation and its translation. Instead, a witness with the necessary
qualifications may testify that he has reviewed each of the recordings,
transcripts, and translations, and is satisfied that the transcripts and
translations are accurate.
129
One additional point merits mention. A translation that accurately
captures the gist of a conversation, and therefore is good enough for
investigative purposes, may prove embarrassing if offered as evidence at
trial. Minor errors or omissions may cause a jury to doubt whether the
translator also cut corners with or misconstrued the essence of what was
said.
2. Methods and Procedures
The witness must establish that he or she used reliable methods to
prepare the translation.130 It is probably common for some bilingual
translate the conversation as it is played in open court would impose extremely adverse working
conditions on the interpreter: instead of working in a quiet room, perhaps with earphones, with the
ability to listen several times to a difficult passage, consult other interpreters and written sources,
the interpreter would be forced to "wing it." Inevitably this would often result in the exclusion of a
recording which is reasonably clear and quite capable of being transcribed and translated under
reasonable working conditions, and would also often result in a translation which is far less accurate
than the interpreter could produce under more reasonable circumstances.
127. See, e.g., Leal v. State, 711 S.W.2d 702, 710 (Tex. App. 1986), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part on other grounds, 782 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (expressing a preference that an
official translator testify and translate the tape into English). However, in another case, the Texas
appellate court also allowed trial judges to accept translations by state witnesses, so long as the
latter are subject to cross-examination, the tapes themselves are admitted into evidence, the defense
had an opportunity to obtain its own translation, and the judge cautions the jury that the state's
translation was not necessarily "authentic." Guerra v. State, 760 S.W.2d 681, 691 (Tex. App. 1988).
128. See, e.g., United States v. Quintana, 508 F.2d 867, 873 (7th Cir. 1975) (in a wiretap lasting
thirty-five days, some 2000 calls were intercepted, of which 153 were drug-related; the investigation
led to indictment of fifteen defendants).
129. United States v. Gutierrez, 367 F.3d 733, 735 (8th Cir. 2004).
130. See FED. R. EVID. 702:
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witnesses to prepare an English translation directly from the foreign
language recording. While this method should not require exclusion of
the translation, it nevertheless should be discouraged. It is far more
preferable for the witness first to transcribe the conversation in the
language in which it was spoken and then to prepare a translation from
the transcript. 131 This is so because preparing such a translation requires
two steps: first, determining what was said in the other language, and
second, translating that into English. Requiring the witness to focus on
each step separately increases the likelihood that each step is performed
accurately. Moreover, it facilitates the process whereby the adverse party
may challenge, and a judge and jury can evaluate, the accuracy of the
translation.
The offering party's witness should be permitted to consult
dictionaries, web sites, and people who speak the foreign language, or
who are bilingual, before arriving at a final transcription and translation.
Each of the professional translators with whom I have spoken agree that
this is highly recommended and, indeed, standard practice whenever
possible. Thus, this practice is consistent with rules governing expert
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the
product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and
methods reliably to the facts of the case.
(emphasis added). See also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993)
(stressing the importance of assessing the "principles and methodolog[ies]" applied by the expert);
Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997) (affirming the importance of these factors, while
recognizing that the trial judge must also assess whether the expert's application of those principles
and methodologies to the facts at hand adequately support the expert's conclusions); Kumho Tire
Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147-53 (1999) (holding that the rules enunciated in Daubert and
Joiner, each of which involved scientific evidence, also apply to expert testimony not based on
science, so long as the witness demonstrated sufficient knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education to satisfy the requirements of Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence).
131. At least two organizations of courtroom-oriented interpreters and translators are in the
process of drafting proposed standards. Each would require that the translator first produce a
transcript in the spoken language, and then prepare a written translation into English. See, e.g., the
training manual produced by the Joint Language Training Center (JLTC), Camp Williams State
Military Preserve, Riverton, Utah (The JLTC is a program which includes members of the United
States Army and Air Force and transcribers and translators employed by various law enforcement
agencies in the Salt Lake City area.) (on file with author); Letter from Ann G. McFarlane, Executive
Dir., Nat'l Ass'n of Judiciary Interpreters and Translators, to author (June 30, 2005) (on file with
author). Each organization urges that the document be prepared in two columns, with the original
language transcription on the left and the English translation on the right. "The two-column format
allows for drawing a clear correlation between the original statement taken down in the transcription
and the resulting translation, which is extremely useful in a trial setting if questions arise regarding
accuracy of translation." Id.
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testimony generally. 132
C. Adverse Party's Challenge to Transcript Accuracy
Once the offering party satisfies its burden of production as to the
translation's accuracy, the burden shifts to the adverse party to challenge
the offering party's showing. 133 If the adverse party does not do so,
inaccuracy or bias should not be presumed. 34 Accordingly, several
federal circuit courts have refused to consider appellate challenges to the
accuracy of a prosecutor's transcript or translation where the defense
neither submitted its own translation to the trial judge nor called the trial
judge's attention to specific inaccuracies in the prosecutor's
translation.
35
132. See FED. R. EVID. 703, which provides:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may
be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences
upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence in order for the opinion
or inference to be admitted. Facts or data that are otherwise inadmissible shall not be disclosed
to the jury by the proponent of the opinion or inference unless the court determines that their
probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert's opinion substantially outweighs
their prejudicial effect.
(emphasis added). Uniform Rule of Evidence 703 is substantively identical.
133. See, e.g., United States v. Armijo, 5 F.3d 1229, 1234-35 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that the
district court did not err in admitting the government's translation where the defendant did not
submit his own translation or present an expert to contest the transcript's accuracy); United States v.
Font-Ramirez, 944 F.2d 42, 47 (1st Cir. 1991) (noting that "[a]fter the government lays a foundation
for the admission of a tape, the party challenging the recording bears the burden of showing that it is
inaccurate" (citation omitted)); United States v. Rosenthal, 793 F.2d 1214, 1238 (11 th Cir. 1986)
(noting that "[i]f the government's translation was inaccurate, it was petitioner's burden to
challenge its accuracy by presenting another translation, so that the jury could choose which version
to believe" (quoting United States v. Llinas, 603 F.2d 506, 509 (5th Cir. 1979))).
134. See, e.g., Font-Ramirez, 944 F.2d at 48 (noting that "[b]ecause [the defendant] did not offer
an alternative transcript and did not point out any specific inaccuracies in the government's
transcript, the district court was within its discretion in allowing its use").
135. See, e.g., United States v. Gutierrez, 367 F.3d 733, 736 (8th Cir. 2004) (noting that since the
defendant "failed to allege that the transcripts were inaccurate, he cannot show that he suffered
prejudice as a result of the instruction given by the district court"); United States v. Franco, 136
F.3d 622, 626 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that where the defendants did not submit a competing
translation, the defendants did not put the accuracy of the transcripts sufficiently in issue for
appeal); United States v. Zambrana, 841 F.2d 1320, 1337-38 (7th Cir. 1988) ("Because the
defendant had ample opportunity not only to challenge the accuracy of the government's transcript
through cross-examination and expert testimony, but also, if he so desired, to present his own
transcript, we hold that the defendant's challenge to the district court's decision to allow the jury to
use the government's transcript as an aid to listening to the taped conversations is without merit.");
United States v. Cruz, 765 F.2d 1020, 1023 (11 th Cir. 1985) ("The district court ... offered Cruz an
opportunity to submit his own [translation]. Cruz's failure to make use of this opportunity was a
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The timing of the adverse party's challenge is also a significant factor.
Translation issues should be resolved before trial whenever possible,
because, once the jury has been seated and the trial has begun, the
offering party may not have time to take corrective action on the
translation. This is particularly important in criminal cases because, once
jeopardy has attached, the prosecutor cannot appeal an adverse ruling.
Thus, so long as the adverse party has had timely access to the recording
and translation, the trial court should require that party to bring such
inaccuracies and possible bias to the court's attention prior to trial.
136
When the party that introduces the recording offers its translation at
trial, its expert is subject to cross-examination by the adverse party. Such
cross-examination can take a variety of approaches, including, among
others, the following. 37 (1) If the conversation was transcribed by one
person and translated by someone else, any weaknesses exposed in the
former's testimony can be reiterated during cross-examination of the
latter. 138 (2) Evidence that a witness is biased or has a motive to shade
his testimony for or against one party is always relevant. 3 9 This is
particularly true in criminal cases, 140 but is also true in civil litigation.
14 1
deliberate tactical decision. Cruz 'cannot complain on appeal that the jury's fact-finding function
was usurped when he failed to present evidence which would have aided the jurors in fulfilling that
function."' (quoting United States v. Llinas, 603 F.2d 506, 510 (5th Cir. 1979))).
136. See Font-Ramirez, 944 F.2d at 47 (noting that "[tihe preferable method for challenging the
tape is through a pre-trial suppression hearing"). But see United States v. Gonzalez, 365 F.3d 656,
660 (8th Cir. 2004), vacated on other grounds and remanded by 125 S. Ct. 1114 (2005) (noting that
"[s]o long as [the defendant] was given the opportunity to challenge the government's translations,
the timing of that challenge is left to the discretion of the district court"); Armijo, 5 F.3d at 1234-35
(refusing to fault a trial judge who did not at any point review the accuracy of the government's
translation, where defendant had pretrial access to the recording and the government's translation
but brought no pretrial challenge to its accuracy); Sparkman v. State, 902 So.2d 253, 258 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2005) (holding that defense counsel's failure to bring a pretrial challenge to aspects of a
recording and transcript, despite the prosecutor's request that counsel do so, did not justify the trial
court's ruling that counsel waived the issue, where the court had not required that such objections
be made prior to trial).
137. The examples offered in this paragraph are based primarily on my eight years' experience as
a trial lawyer and thirty years' experience as an evidence professor.
138. "You did not yourself listen to the conversation, did you?-You relied solely on the written
transcript prepared by witness X, correct? So if X made any mistakes in transcribing the
conversation in [the foreign language], those mistakes would of course appear as well in your
translation, wouldn't they?"
139. See, e.g., United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 52 (1984) ("Bias is a term used ... to describe
the relationship between a party and a witness which might lead the witness to slant, unconsciously
or otherwise, his testimony in favor of or against a party.").
140. The U.S. Supreme Court has held as a general matter that in criminal cases, a defendant's
right to offer evidence from which defense counsel can argue bias or motive to lie often trumps
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Where the facts make it appropriate, the cross-examiner can suggest that
the witness who transcribed or translated a conversation favored the
party offering the transcription or translation in evidence. 142 (3) Counsel
can expose and exploit differences between earlier drafts of the offering
party's transcript or translation and the version offered at trial,
particularly if each subsequent version became more favorable to the
offering party. 143 (4) Where the adverse party's expert has identified
what he or she believes are specific errors in the offering party's
transcription or translation, counsel can question the offering party's
witness about each. 44 Just as, in an English conversation, a dispute
might arise as to whether a person said "I'm gonna" or "Ain' gonna," so
too, for example, people fluent in Spanish might disagree as to whether a
person said "roja" ("red"), "ropa" ("clothing") or "roca" ("rock")-
which could be quite significant, particularly if the government claims
other rules that would otherwise exclude the evidence. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-18
(1974) (holding that defendant's right to confront and cross examine state witnesses, guaranteed by
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, mandated that defendant be permitted to bring out a state
witness's juvenile delinquency adjudication for burglary and resultant probation, as a basis to argue
that the witness therefore might have hastily identified the defendant as the man he saw in
connection with an unrelated burglary, for fear that otherwise the police would suspect him, despite
a state statute protecting juveniles from public disclosure of such adjudications); Olden v. Kentucky,
488 U.S. 227, 231-32 (1988) (holding that it was reversible error to preclude a rape defendant from
eliciting that the complainant, a white married woman, was having an affair with, and living with,
an African American man (not her husband) at the time of the incident, despite the state court's
concern that the evidence might be "extreme(ly) prejudicial" to the complainant, because the
information provided a basis for defendant to argue that the complainant falsely accused him of rape
out of concern that her boyfriend might spurn her if he learned that she had consented to have sex
with defendant); Abel, 469 U.S. at 56 (holding that evidence that a defense witness belonged to a
"secret prison organization" that required its members to lie for one another, was admissible despite
FED. R. EVID. 608(b), which generally precludes impeaching a witness with extrinsic evidence of
prior acts of untruthfulness).
141. See, e.g., 2 CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN & ANNE T. MCKENNA, JONES ON EVIDENCE § 9:27 (7th
ed. 1994) (in negligence cases, a plaintiff may elicit that a defense witness is paid by the defendant,
to suggest the witness is biased for or is interested in furthering the defendant's case); id. (Supp.
2006) (discussing the application of this principle in medical malpractice suits). Bias in civil actions
may arise in a variety of other contexts as well. See, e.g., Cissel v. W. Plumbing and Heating, Inc.,
612 P.2d 206, 210-211 (1980) (admitting evidence that witness who testified for the plaintiff did so
because the plaintiff threatened to kill the witness).
142. Compare Font-Ramirez, 944 F.2d at 48 (observing that a transcriber's bias is a factor in
assessing the admissibility of a transcript).
143. See, e.g., United States v. Armijo, 5 F.3d 1229, 1234-35 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting that defense
counsel used this tactic).
144. See, e.g., United States v. Franco, 136 F.3d 622, 628-29 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that defense
counsel cross-examined the government's translator as to why she translated "458" as a number
rather than as a time of day).
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that the word that was spoken is slang or code for illegal activity.145 (5)
Similarly, counsel, relying on information provided by his or her own
expert, could ask the offering party's expert about alternate translations
of a particular word or phrase.
After the offering party rests, the adverse party can call its translator.
Like the offering party, the adverse party must first elicit testimony that
establishes its witness's qualifications. 46 The adverse party may then
have that witness critique the offering party's transcript, 147 and offer its
own transcript.148
D. Assessing Accuracy: Roles of Judge and Jury
As a general rule, a judge is not authorized to exclude expert
testimony merely because the judge disagrees with the expert's
conclusions. 149 Rather, the judge's role is limited to assessing the
witness's qualifications, the principles and methods the expert applied to
the data at hand, and whether there is a reasonable basis for the expert's
145. See 2 COMMUNITY EPIDEMIOLOGY WORK GROUP, NAT'L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE,
EPIDEMIOLOGIC TRENDS IN DRUG ABUSE 151 (2002), http://www.drugabuse.gov/PDF/CEWG/
Vol2_1202.pdf (referring to the term "roca" as Spanish slang for crack cocaine).
146. See supra Part II.B.1.
147. In United States v. Zambrana, a defense expert testified that "there were a lot of errors" in
the government's transcript and translation:
They were vocabularies that were mistranslated. There were a lot of areas that said
unintelligible, but it really was intelligible. There [sic] completely wrong constructions in
terms of putting words that weren't there and omitting the words that were there and so, you
know-it's difficult. I'm not saying that-they are hard to listen to, and it's-and you have-
it's very rapid speech. It's a phone conversation, so you don't get the benefit of looking at a
person in the face. You have all kinds of difficulties. I can understand that people would make
a mistake in transcribing these.
841 F.2d 1320, 1336 (7th Cir. 1988). On the other hand, Zambrana also illustrates that calling such
a witness has its risks, because on cross the defense expert verified that in many instances the
government's translations of key phrases were correct. Id. at 1336-37.
148. United States v. Ademaj, 170 F.3d 58, 65-66 (1st Cir. 1999) (observing that because the
defendant failed to offer a "sufficient objection" to the government's translation of conversations in
Greek and also failed to offer an alternative translation, it was no abuse of discretion for the trial
judge to authorize use of the government's "duly authenticated" translation at trial and during jury
deliberations "subject to an appropriate cautionary instruction"); Franco, 136 F.3d at 626
(approving the trial court's instruction to the defense to submit its own "competing translations of
disputed passages," and its conclusion that, given the defendants' failure to do so, the accuracy of
the government's translations had not been placed in issue).
149. See, e.g., Deputy v. Lehman Bros. Inc., 345 F.3d 494, 506-08 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that
the trial judge committed reversible error in excluding a handwriting expert's opinion based on the
judge's assessment of the expert's "credibility and persuasiveness").
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opinion.15 ° Assuming the proponent satisfies this test, it is up to the
adverse party to challenge that expert on cross-examination, to offer its
own expert witness, or both. 5 '
Applying these principles to a translation of a foreign language
recorded conversation, the judge's role should be limited to assessing
whether the offering party has satisfied the standards set out in the
previous paragraph.1 52  A translation is sufficiently accurate if it
"reasonably conveys the intent or idea of the thought spoken."' 153 If
reasonable people could disagree as to whether the recording contains
the words written out in that party's proffered transcript and as to
whether those words mean what appears in that party's proffered
translation, the judge should admit the translation, and let the jury decide
on the accuracy of the transcription and translation.
This is not to suggest that the trial judge's role must be totally
passive. Where the adverse party contests the accuracy of a few crucial
passages, the trial judge should urge the parties to attempt to arrive at a
transcription and translation that both sides can stipulate is accurate.
154
As part of this effort, it might be worthwhile for the judge to seek the
assistance of someone (such as a court interpreter) who is identified with
neither party and is therefore less likely to be influenced by a
subconscious desire to help one side or the other. 155 If this neutral
witness can persuade both parties to accept a particular translation, so
much the better. Where (as will often occur) no such agreement is
150. See id. (noting that the trial judge's role in assessing expert testimony is limited to
evaluating the "reliability" of the expert's principles and methods and application thereof).
151. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993) (stating that "[v]igorous
cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof
are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence").
152. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
153. United States v. Zambrana, 841 F.2d 1320, 1337 (7th Cir. 1988).
154. See United States v. Font-Ramirez, 944 F.2d 42, 48 (1st Cir. 1991) (noting that "[i]t is
advisable for a trial judge to obtain a stipulated transcript"); United States v. Llinas, 603 F.2d 506,
509 (5th Cir. 1979) (noting that the court and the parties should make an initial effort to stipulate to
a transcript that satisfies all sides); United States v. Gonzales, 365 F.3d 656, 660 (8th Cir. 2004),
vacated on other grounds, 543 U.S. 1107 (2005) (noting that "like our sister circuits, we believe that
whenever the parties intend to introduce a transcript at trial, they should first try to produce an
official or stipulated transcript, one which satisfies all sides" (internal citations omitted)). It may
often occur, however, that defense counsel in a criminal case will not stipulate to the accuracy of the
government's translation for the simple reason that doing so could be tantamount to stipulating to
the defendant's guilt.
155. See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 67 (2d ed.
2000) (noting "the broader inherent authority of the court to appoint experts who are necessary to
enable the court to carry out its duties").
Vol. 81:473, 2006
Recordings, Transcripts, Translations
reached, however, the judge should not automatically accept this neutral
court-appointed witness's conclusions as determinative, since that
expert's ability to translate the conversation accurately is subject to the
same standards as the other experts.
Where the parties are unable to stipulate to a transcript or translation,
the issue becomes a matter of fact that is best left to the jury. Assuming
the offering party's translation meets the standard discussed earlier, 56 if
the adverse party disputes what the conversants said or what their words
mean in English the ultimate trier of fact should resolve the dispute.
When the offering party introduces its translation into evidence, its
expert is subject to cross-examination by the adverse party. 57 The
adverse party may also offer its own transcript.158 As each translation is
admitted into evidence, the trial judge should give an appropriate
instruction. 5 9
E. Contents of Translations to be Presented to the Jury
The principles governing issues such as voice identification,
description of sounds on the transcript, and the exclusion of explanatory
material, discussed earlier with regard to a transcript of an English
language conversation, 60 apply equally to a translation of a foreign
language conversation. Slang and code words, however, pose unique
issues with regard to translations of foreign language conversations.
Should the translation be literal? Or should it translate idioms and
colloquialisms to more accurately reflect what the speakers presumably
meant? Should the translator interpret code words and jargon to give an
opinion about what the participants were actually communicating to
each other?
Anyone who has ever attempted to learn a foreign language quickly
realizes that a translation should not be literal: to translate a colloquial
expression literally will often produce something that makes little or no
sense 16 and will sometimes produce a result that makes some sense-
156. See supra Part 11.13.2.
157. See supra notes 137-145 and accompanying text.
158. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
159. See discussion ofjury instructions infra Part II.G.
160. See supra Part I.B.4.
161. Consider the following passage from Nabil M. Abdel-Al:
Libyans... say: [an Arabic phrase] which literally translates to "in the year of fenugreek." The
Egyptian equivalent to that is [an Arabic phrase which literally translates to] "in the apricot."
Neither of these two variants means anything if interpreted literally. A non-Libyan or non-
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but in a very different way than what was intended. 162 Courts recognize
this reality. As the Eighth Circuit commented in a 2004 decision, United
States v. Gonzalez:' 63 "Generally, transcripts of translated conversations
need not be verbatim. In the case of slang terms or idioms which are
widely used and understood by the native speakers of the foreign
language, translators are allowed to provide nonliteral translations so
that the foreign term or phrase makes sense in English."'164 The court in
Gonzales recognized, however, that a distinction must be made between
slang or colloquial expressions, on the one hand, and a specialized code
developed by a particular group of criminals, on the other. 165 The
government's translation in that case rendered the Spanish words
"mosca" and "tontas" as "money" and "tons," respectively, when their
literal meanings are "fly" and "dummies." 166 The court was, correctly,
highly critical:
[I]n the case at bar we are not dealing with the translation of
common slang terms or idioms. The government's theory at trial
was not that "mosca" ("fly") and "tontas" ("dummies") are
generally used by Spanish speakers to mean "money" and
"tons." Rather, the government's theory was that Gonzalez and
his cohorts used those meanings to facilitate communication in
Egyptian Arab would be baffled, but these expressions are the equivalent of "in your dreams"
or "when pigs fly." The Libyan expression is derived from the fact that they do not grow
fenugreek. Thus, the connotation is "if the impossible happens."
NABIL M. ABDEL-AL, supra note 109, at 4.
162. It was my responsibility once as vice president of my synagogue to inform the congregation
at the end of Sabbath services of the many disruptions and dislocations we would face during
construction of a new wing. After spelling out the details, I summed up: "Things will be
inconvenient for awhile, but, after all," and then concluded with a (literal) Hebrew translation of a
common English expression. Like most of my fellow congregants, I'm pretty good at prayer book
Hebrew but, alas, do not actually speak the language. Those who were fluent in Hebrew, on the
other hand, had a hard time restraining themselves. I found out later that what I had told the
congregation, in contemporary Hebrew, was: "... but after all, you can't make an omelet without
busting balls."
163. 365 F.3d 656 (8th Cir. 2004), vacated on other grounds, 543 U.S. 1107 (2005).
164. Id. at 660 (internal citations omitted). See also United States v. Garcia, 20 F.3d 670, 673 (6th
Cir. 1994) (noting approvingly that "[t]hough the translation is not purely literal, the expert stated
that it departs only so idioms and other forms of speech make sense in English"); United States v.
Zambrana, 841 F.2d 1320, 1337 (7th Cir. 1988) (noting that "[ijt is axiomatic that a translation of
most foreign languages to English (and vice versa) can never convey precisely and exactly the same
idea and intent comprised in the original text, and it is unrealistic to impose an impossible
requirement of exactness before allowing a translation to be considered by a jury" (internal citations
omitted)).
165. Gonzalez, 365 F.3d at 660-61.
166. Id. at 660.
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their covert drug operations. The problem is that the
government's transcript suggested that these words literally
mean something they do not.
Although it is unnecessary for a translator to take the
intermediate step of providing a literal translation of common
slang terms or idioms, we believe more precision is required
when dealing with alleged drug code in criminal trials. The
potential for prejudice is too great in the latter situation. 161
To relate to the jury what the government claimed the conversants
really meant, the court instructed, the translator or some other witness
must establish that he or she is qualified as a "drug code expert" in order
to testify to his or her opinion regarding the contextual meaning of the
word. 168 Further, the court noted that "[1]ike all expert testimony, this
opinion will be subject to attack on cross-examination and by the
introduction of opposing opinions from other qualified experts."
'1 69
Even where an everyday word has a widely recognized secondary
meaning within a criminal milieu, it is better to translate it as the former,
not the latter. Consider, for example, the Spanish word for lard,
"manteca," which, in at least some parts of the Latino world, is also a
well-known slang expression for heroin. 170 Even where it is obvious in
context that "manteca" is being used to describe an illicit substance, not
lard, the translator should translate it as "lard." To translate it as "heroin"
could mislead the jury into believing that the conversants were far more
explicit than they actually were.
How such a term is translated can also have a significant tactical
impact. If "manteca" is translated as "heroin," this provides defense
167. Id. at 660-61 (citations omitted) (citing United States v. Rena, 981 F.2d 765, 769 (5th Cir.
1993)).
168. Id. at 660, 661 n.2 ("Unlike commonly used slang terms and idioms, drug code is
presumably known and understood by only a small segment of the population. Thus, it is not
appropriate to presume, without laying a foundation, that a translator is qualified to give opinions
relating to alleged drug code.").
169. Id. at 661.
170. "Manteca" is so listed at OFFICE OF NAT'L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, PULSE CHECK: TRENDS
IN DRUG AeUSE 28 (2002), http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/drugfact/
pulsechk/nov02/pulsenov02.pdf. And I am informed that "heroin" is listed as one of the definitions
of "manteca" in JOSEFINA A. CLAUDIO DE LA TORRE, DICCIONARIO DE LA JERGA DEL ESTUDIANTE
UNIVERSITARIO PUERTORRIQUENO 154 (San Juan: Editorial de la Universidad de Puerto Rico 1989).
See e-mail from Dagoberto Orrantia, professional interpreter and translator and member of the Nat'l
Ass'n of Judiciary Interpreters and Translators, to author (May 30, 2005) (on file with author).
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counsel with a basis to attack the translator's integrity.1 7' Translating the
term as "lard," by contrast, gives the prosecutor an opportunity to drive
home the point that the conversants were using drug traffic jargon. 172
F. Presenting Conversations and Translations to the Jury
Courts have struggled over the most appropriate way to present
recorded foreign-language conversations and translations to the jury.
Should the recordings be played at all? If not, what alternatives are
available? In addition, issues sometimes arise as to the applicability of
specific statutes.
1. Should the Recording be Played for the Jury?
Where a recorded conversation is entirely or substantially in English,
the preferred, and prevailing, practice is to distribute copies of the
transcript or project the transcript on a screen for the jury. 173 This
171. Imagine: "Officer, are you telling this jury that if a housewife walks into a shop and asks the
clerk for a kilogram of manteca, she is a heroin dealer?"
172. Picture this scenario: A prosecutor calls the government's translator as a witness, establishes
the witness's credentials, elicits testimony as to how the transcript and translation were prepared,
authenticates them, and introduces them into evidence. The direct examination (which the
prosecutor and witness have carefully rehearsed beforehand) continues:
Q:... Now, on page 3, line 7 of the translation, Guillermo says, "He still owes me 27 for the
kilo of lard I sold him last week." Do you see that?
A: I see it.
Q: What is the Spanish word that you have translated as "lard"?
A: "Manteca."
Q: "Manteca." Does that word have any well-recognized secondary meanings?
A: Yes, "manteca" is often used among drug dealers to mean "heroin."
Q: "Manteca" is often used to mean "heroin"! How do you know that?
[The government witness cites Spanish language dictionaries, a White House web site of
frequently used drug jargon, and conversations he has had with undercover officers, informants
and other translators.]
Q: You consulted dictionaries, web sites, other people.... Is that normal procedure?
A: Yes, sir, it is standard operating procedure.
If the witness is particularly well prepared, he or she will then cite to specific provisions in an
instruction manual, textbook, or the like, confirming that this is standard operating procedure among
professional translators.
Q: The prosecutor looks meaningfully at the jury and asks: "And each of these sources say that
'manteca' is often used to mean 'heroin'?"
Later, another witness testifies that the price of heroin at that particular time ranged from, say,
$25,000 to $30,000 per kilogram. During closing argument, the prosecutor scornfully and
sarcastically refers to "that $27,000 kilogram of 'lard."'
173. See supra Part I.B.
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practice allows the jury to read the transcript as they listen to the
recording. Jurors are able to assess whether the transcript is accurate and
to hear the participants' tone of voice, inflection, etc.-which can
greatly assist a listener in evaluating what each speaker is attempting to
convey.
Where the conversation is in a foreign language, on the other hand, it
is usually best to distribute the translations to the jury without playing
the recording for them.174 There are several reasons. First, conversations
in a foreign language will be incomprehensible to jurors who do not
speak that language. Those jurors, therefore, would not be able to
evaluate the accuracy of a direct transcription of the conversation, let
alone the accuracy of the translation. 175 Second, while hearing the actual
conversation helps jurors to understand each declarant's meaning if the
conversation is in English, a juror's ability to do so with regard to a
conversation in a foreign language, at least without expert assistance, is
highly questionable. 176 Distributing a translation without playing the
recording will prevent jury attempts to rely on inflections and emphases
in the foreign language that they do not understand. 77 Third, playing the
174. Doing so does not violate the "best evidence rule." See FED. R. EvID. 1002. That rule, as
applied to recordings and transcripts, mandates that a party seeking to introduce a transcript (or
translation) of a recorded conversation must produce the recording (or explain its absence) before
secondary evidence such as a transcript may be admitted. See supra Part I.B.3. As discussed earlier,
the rule was created as a safeguard against mistake or fraud. By producing the original recording,
the offering party satisfies the purposes underlying the rule: the adverse party can examine the
recording for alterations and have its own expert evaluate the offering party's transcript and
translation. The rule does not, however, mandate that the recording be played to the jury as a
prerequisite to distribution of a translation of the conversation, where doing so would serve no
useful purpose, or would create a risk of confusing or misleading the jury. See FED. R. EVID. 403
(directing that, "[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of... confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations
of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence"). As I argue in the
text immediately following this note, as a rule, listening to a recording of a foreign language
conversation will have little or no probative value to jurors who do not speak the language, will
waste time, may mislead or confuse the jury, and may create additional problems as well.
175. United States v. Estrada, 256 F.3d 466, 472-73 (7th Cir. 2001) (noting that "the district
court saw no value in allowing a presumably English speaking jury to hear tapes that were recorded
in Spanish. It is difficult to second-guess such a decision"); United States v. Franco, 136 F.3d 622,
626-29 (9th Cir. 1998); United States v. Bahadar, 954 F.2d 821, 829-31 (2d Cir. 1992).
176. United States v. Grajales-Montoya, 117 F.3d 356, 367 (8th Cir. 1997) (noting and affirming
the trial court's reasoning that a jury member who was not proficient in Spanish was not likely to
"discern relevant inflections and idiosyncrasies").
177. As the Eighth Circuit observed in Grajales-Montoya, "[Defendant] has suggested no reliable
means of enabling people who do not speak Spanish to interpret inflections and tone, and we cannot
think of any, either." Id. See also Franco, 136 F.3d at 629 (upholding the district court's ruling that
inflections and emphasis in a foreign language would not be enlightening and could be misleading
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conversation can create a substantial problem if some, but not all, of the
jurors speak the language in question. The bilingual jurors would
become, in essence, expert "witnesses" who, because they share their
interpretations (which may not be accurate) with fellow jurors in the jury
room rather than on the witness stand, cannot be cross-examined by the
adverse party. 178 Although playing the recording to a partially bilingual
jury is not by itself reversible error, 179 the risks of doing so seem to
outweigh the questionable benefits.
In some circumstances, however, playing at least a portion of a
conversation for the jury may be useful, and perhaps even necessary to
assure a fair trial. First, doing so might be useful where disputes exist as
to the identification of voices or the audibility or intelligibility of the
recording. Assume for example in a criminal case, that one conversation
consists of a phone call made to a phone listed in defendant X's name. A
man answers the call and identifies himself as X, and, during the
conversation, mentions his wife and children by name, talks about the
to the jury); Estrada, 256 F.3d at 472-73 (upholding the district court's "apparent" determination
that there was "no value in allowing a presumably English speaking jury to hear tapes that were
recorded in Spanish"). But see United States v. Cruz, 765 F2d 1020, 1024 (11th Cir. 1985) ("The
district court played the tape recording for the jury and had an interpreter signal the jury when it was
appropriate to turn the pages of the transcript. This procedure enabled the jury to detect changes in
voice modulation and note any hesitancies or other characteristics which might give meaning to the
tape recording.").
178. See People v. Cabrera, 281 Cal. Rptr. 238, 240 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that it
was reversible error for a juror, during jury deliberations, to retranslate an expert witness'
translation of a conversation). But see Hernandez v. State, 938 S.W.2d 503, 507-08 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1997) (holding that because the defendant failed to produce the juror's translation, he failed to
demonstrate that discrepancies existed between the official and the juror's translation, and therefore
failed to establish that the juror improperly introduced new evidence during deliberations). In
Hernandez, it seems strange to fault the defendant for failing to produce a translation which, for all
we know, may have been verbal, not written, or which, if written, may have been discarded by the
jurors after they announced their verdict, long before the defendant ever knew it existed.
179. See United States v. Rodriguez, 63 F.3d 1159, 1167 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding that the
presence of some Spanish words on a recorded conversation between defendant and a drug agent
posed no bar to admissibility, despite defendant's claim that some jurors might have acted as
interpreters for other jurors); United States v. Rivera, 778 F.2d 591, 600 (10th Cir. 1985) (holding
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing jurors, one of whom spoke Spanish, to
access recordings where there were no indications of impropriety). Similarly, courts have held that
the presence of bilingual jurors does not require withholding recordings or translations from the jury
during deliberations. See id. at 600 (noting that "[i]ndividual jurors bring different skills and
backgrounds to the deliberations of juries in most cases. The circumstances involved here are not
indicative of any impropriety"); United States v. Lam Lek Chong, 544 F.2d 58, 71 (2d Cir. 1976)
(holding that it was not error for the trial court to send transcripts to the jury room for a "limited
purpose" not specified in the opinion); United States v. Main, 513 F.2d 974, 977 (2d Cir. 1975)
(finding nothing objectionable when jury took transcripts to jury room).
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new car he just purchased, and describes where he went on a particular
evening-all facts which investigators have independently corroborated.
All of this convincingly establishes that X was in fact the speaker.'
80
Next, the prosecutor plays the recording of another phone conversation,
the translation of which is as follows:
Defendant Y Hello.
Defendant X: Hello. Do you know who this is?
Defendant Y: Yes. Is everything set?
Defendant X: Almost. I still have to talk to the guy. Meet me when
and where we said.1
81
Although the call was made from a phone that investigators cannot
connect to defendant X and neither participant used X's name, the
government identifies X as the caller based on an agent's testimony that
he has listened to the two recordings, has compared the voices, and is
convinced that X, the recipient of the first call, is the person who made
the second call. 182 If X denies he participated in the second call, it may
be worthwhile to play both conversations to the jury, even though they
don't speak the language, so jurors can assess whether the voice
attributed to X in the second call sounds like X's voice in the first call.
Second, where the adverse party challenges the recording's audibility
(capability of being heard) or intelligibility (capability of being
understood), the offering party might reasonably offer to play a portion
of the tape to prove its audibility and intelligibility. Likewise, the
adverse party may offer to do so to prove the opposite. If the adverse
party emphasizes the poor quality of the original recording, the offering
party might offer to play a portion of an electronically enhanced
recording that was used in preparing the transcript and translation.
Third, inflection and emphasis are guideposts to meaning. We all
know that the printed word, stripped of spoken inflection, can be very
misleading. Consider how, depending on tone of voice, the reply, "Yeah,
right," can indicate substantial agreement-or its opposite. An attorney
180. See FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(6) (providing that the requirement of voice identification is
satisfied "by evidence that a call was made to the number assigned at the time by the telephone
company to a particular person [if] circumstances, including self-identification, show the person
answering to be the one called").
181. 1 made this conversation up for purposes of illustration, but anyone who has participated in a
wiretap to investigate experienced criminals has heard this sort of conversation quite frequently.
(Indeed, this conversation is far more straightforward than many I encountered as a prosecutor.)
182. See FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(5), providing that it suffices to identify a voice, "whether heard
firsthand or through mechanical or electronic transmission or recording, by opinion based upon
hearing the voice at any time under circumstances connecting it with the alleged speaker."
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who claims that the lack of inflection and tone of the words on the page
misconstrue her client's meaning should do more than merely seek
permission to play the conversation to the jury. Through an expert
witness fluent in that language, the attorney should pinpoint the
particular passage or passages in question and elicit testimony why,
based on how the words were said, they should not be taken literally.
183
Fourth, challenges to transcription accuracy arguably could be
resolved by playing the recording of the foreign language conversation.
If the adverse party's expert asserts that a particular word or passage of a
conversation was transcribed incorrectly (and therefore is mistranslated),
the trial judge might consider playing that portion of the conversation for
the jury as each witness testifies about it, so the jury can hear it for
themselves. But this presupposes that a juror who does not speak a
language will nevertheless be able to discern which transcription
correctly captured the "sound" of what was said, which is a doubtful
proposition at best.
2. The Alternatives
In lieu of playing the recording to the jury, some courts have opted to
have the transcript read aloud to the jury. 184 But at least one court,
reasoning that even a neutral reader may interject emphasis or distortion
into the process, concluded that the better way is simply to distribute the
translations to the jurors, watch as they read the transcripts to
themselves, and then collect the transcripts again. 185 The latter approach
183. The position I advocate here is not inconsistent with my earlier argument in this section that
jurors who do not speak the foreign language could not on their own correctly interpret inflections
and tone. See supra notes 176-177 and accompanying text. An expert witness, by contrast, could
demonstrate, by illustrating different inflections and tones of voice, how the same words in that
language could have several different meanings-just as the words "yeah, right" do in English.
184. See United States v. Bahadar, 954 F.2d 821, 829-31 (2d Cir. 1992) (approving the district
court's decision not to play tapes containing conversations conducted mostly in Punjab and Urdu,
but rather to have a participant in the conversation read the portions the transcript attributed to him;
the parts of the translation attributed to the defendant were read aloud, first by the prosecutor and,
after the defense attorney objected to the prosecutor's tone of voice and overall presentation, by
defense counsel); United States v. Rengifo, 789 F.2d 975, 977, 983 (1st Cir. 1986) (approving the
prosecution's decision to have two individuals, each taking the role of a conversant, read the
transcript to the jury); United States v. Vazquez, 605 F.2d 1269, 1272 n.4 (2d Cir. 1979) (observing
that instead of playing Spanish language tapes, the prosecution distributed an English translation to
the jury; a government agent read the translation aloud, identifying the speakers as the jury took
notes); Pena v. State, 432 So. 2d 715, 717 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (noting that the state "read" the
transcript to the jury).
185. United States v. Franco, 136 F.3d 622, 628-29 (9th Cir. 1998).
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might be preferable-so long as the judge is confident that each of the
jurors is sufficiently literate in English to read and understand the
translation.
3. Jury Access to Translations During Deliberations
It is not unusual for a jury to seek to examine, during its deliberations,
evidence that has been admitted at trial. A number of courts have held
that a trial judge has discretion to permit jurors to have a translation of a
foreign language conversation in the jury room during deliberations. 18 6
But some courts have expressed concern generally as to whether
allowing a tape recording to go to the jury room emphasizes that
evidence unduly,' 87 and such concerns are equally applicable to the
translation of a foreign language conversation.
4. Court Reporter Act, Jones Act
Two federal statutes are occasionally cited in court opinions relating
to transcripts and translations of recorded conversations. The Court
Reporter Act 188 requires that "all proceedings in criminal cases [held] in
open court... shall be recorded verbatim."' 189 This provision does not,
however, require a court stenographer to transcribe the contents of
recordings that are played as evidence at a trial.' 90 The Jones Act' 91
186. Id. at 628 (stating that "we find no abuse of discretion in sending the [translated] transcripts
to the jury room when there is no cognizable dispute concerning the accuracy of the translation");
United States v. Ademaj, 170 F.3d 58, 65 (1st Cir. 1999) (observing that because the defendant
failed to offer a "sufficient objection" to the government's translation of conversations in Greek and
also failed to offer an alternative translation, it was no abuse of discretion for the trial judge to
authorize use of the government's "duly authenticated" translation at trial and during jury
deliberations "subject to an appropriate cautionary instruction").
187. See, e.g., State v. Bales, 994 P.2d 17, 21-22 (Mont. 1999) (holding that it was error to
permit the jury to have an English language recording in the jury room without a prior assessment of
the risk of undue emphasis, albeit harmless under the circumstances).
188. 28 U.S.C. § 753(b) (1996).
189. Id.
190. United States v. Morales-Madera, 352 F.3d 1, 6-7 (1st Cir. 2003) (rejecting statements to the
contrary made in United States v. Andiarena, 823 F.2d 673, 676 (1st Cir. 1987)); United States v.
Craig, 573 F.2d 455, 480 (7th Cir. 1977) (concluding that there was "no merit" to the claim that the
Court Reporter Act was violated because the reporter did not transcribe a recorded conversation).
But see United States v. McCusker, 936 F.2d 781, 785 (5th Cir. 1991) (suggesting that although the
court reporter is obliged to transcribe a recorded conversation, where the recording of the
conversation is available on appellate review, the error is harmless). No court-not even the Fifth
Circuit-has ever cited McCusker approvingly for this proposition, and it has been criticized or
differentiated by at least two courts. See Morales-Madera, 352 F.3d at 6-7; see also Emmel v.
Washington Law Review Vol. 81:473, 2006
provides that "[a]ll pleadings and proceedings in the United States
District Court for the District of Puerto Rico shall be conducted in the
English language. '' 99 The First Circuit has held that "[p]roviding an
English-language transcript of [a recorded conversation conducted in
Spanish] is more than merely useful when the recorded language is not
English; for Jones Act purposes, it is necessary."1 93 Thus, it violates the
Jones Act for Spanish-speaking jurors to "cast aside" the English
translation and use Spanish transcripts instead.
94
G. Jury Instructions
A translation plays a very different role than does the transcript of a
conversation conducted in English. It makes no sense for the judge to
instruct jurors, as many courts insist with regard to transcripts of English
language tapes,195 that the translation is merely an "assistance to
understanding" the recording, or that they should disregard the
translation if what they hear conflicts with what they read. 196 Rather, the
judge must instruct the jury to regard the transcript as evidence - and
how to evaluate it.
197
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Chicago, 904 F. Supp. 723, 752 (N.D. Ill. 1995). Moreover McCusker
held that if such an obligation existed, where the recording of the conversation is available on
appellate review, the error is harmless. See McCusker, 936 F.2d at 785.
191. 48 U.S.C. § 864 (2000).
192. Id.
193. Morales-Madera, 352 F.3d at 6.
194. United States v. Rivera-Rosario, 300 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2003).
195. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
196. United States v. Gutierrez, 367 F.3d 733, 736 (8th Cir. 2004) (finding no prejudice,
however, because "[defendant] failed to allege that the transcripts were inaccurate"); United States
v. Gonzalez, 365 F.3d 656, 661 (8th Cir. 2004), vacated on other grounds, 125 S. Ct. 1114 (2005)
(finding only harmless error, however, because defendant repeatedly raised discrepancies in the
government's translation throughout the trial); United States v. Rrapi, 175 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir.
1999).
197. The Seventh Circuit instruction is as follows:
Among the exhibits admitted during the trial were recordings that contained conversations in
the language. You were also provided with English transcripts of those
conversations. The transcripts were provided to you [by the government] so that you could
consider the content of the conversations on the recordings.
Whether a transcript is an accurate translation, in whole or in part, is for you to decide. In
considering whether a transcript accurately describes the meaning of a conversation, you
should consider the testimony presented to you regarding how, and by whom, the transcript
was made. You may consider the knowledge, training, and experience of the translator, as well
as the nature of the conversation and the reasonableness of the translation in light of all the
evidence in the case. You should not rely in any way on any knowledge you may have of the
Recordings, Transcripts, Translations
CONCLUSION
Recorded conversations, and transcripts of those conversations, play a
vital role in civil-and even more so in criminal-trials, often providing
the evidence needed to establish a defendant's guilt and, occasionally,
his or her innocence. Rather than treating a transcript as a non-
evidentiary "aid to understanding" the recording, therefore, a transcript
of a recording should be recognized for what it is, i.e., opinion evidence
as to the contents of the recording, and its admissibility should be
governed by the same rules and procedures that apply to opinion
evidence generally.
More frequently today than ever before, prosecutors, and occasionally
defendants or civil litigants, seek to use, as evidence, recordings of
conversations conducted in a language other than English. However,
such recordings are meaningless to the typical juror unless a translation
is provided. A translation of a foreign language conversation constitutes
expert opinion evidence, which should be subject to the same principles
and procedures as those governing expert opinion generally.
Application of the appropriate standards and procedures to
recordings, transcripts, and translations will assure that the party offering
the evidence will have a fair opportunity to establish the accuracy of its
evidence to the judge and jury; that the adverse party will be able to
challenge that evidence; and that the jury will have an adequate basis on
which to evaluate it.
language spoken on the recording; your consideration of the transcripts should be based on the
evidence introduced in the trial.
COMM. ON FED. JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT, FEDERAL CRIMINAL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 46 (West Group 1999). See United States v. Jordan, 223
F.3d 676, 689 n.10 (7th Cir. 2000). The Eighth Circuit has endorsed this instruction and urged its
district courts to use it. See Gutierrez, 367 F.3d at 736.
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